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INTRODUCTION 
1. Purpose. 
The evils of nature have always occasioned philosophical 
!I interpretations of reality. Moral evils as they are evidenced 
'! 
in wars and crime have also been the subject of the philosoph-
ical and theological research of men. The rise of modern 
science and the consequent contraction of world society, togeth-
er with the rise of world wars and increasing knowledge of the 
disease and suffering of men, have encouraged contemporary phil-
!I osophic investigation of the problem of evil. Interpreters who 
~ I 
\\ have lived among the facts, neglecting the reason of the whole, 
u 
!I have often been pessimistic, while those who have been persuaded 
il 
n of the reasonableness of the whole have overlooked the obtrusive 
:i 
d . 
'1 character of evil facts. The interpretation of the problem of 
i\ 
>I 
ii evil by Royce is especially important as an attempt 
i1 l! J Scylla of optimism and the Charybdis of pessimism. 
:! 
to avoid the 
'! 
,J 
'I 
The purpose of this paper is to attempt to evaluate and 
1j criticize Royce 1 s interpretation of the problem 
I· 
<i lt 
!! light of a consideration of his world view. 
:I 
'I 
li 
li 
" ,, 
2. Literature. 
of evil in the 
~~ The more important works of Royce which deal with the prob-' 
1
Jlem of evil are The Religious As pee t _of Philosophy ( Cambridge : 
=, =o~-="·=~4The Riverside _fre_~_-_J.a8.5); The Sp:i r:1 t Qf .Mod@r~J.o.j.Q~.1Bos-, 
!I 
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!I Introduction 
ii !I ton: Houghton, riiifflin and Company, 1893), The Con.ce;e_tioll of. God' 
1! 1 (New York: The Macmillan Company,· (1897)1902), Studi_es of Good I, 
il and Evil (New York: D. Appleton and Company, (1898)1915), The 
il 
I' :I -~vorld and the Individual, 2 Volumes (New York: The Macmillan 
I! il Cmmpany, 1900), 11 The Eternal and the Practical 11 (in The Philo-
:; 
!j ii sop~!. cal Review, Vol. XIII, New York: 'I'he Macmillan Company, 
!I !, 1904), The Philosoph::[ of Loyalty (New York: The Macmillan Com-
li 
!J pany, (1908)1909), and The Problem <?_Uhristianity, 2 Volu_mes 
i. 
II (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914). ~ ! 
i! 
:! Although the general features of Hoyce's thought remained 
:11· 
'I consistent throughout his works, some important chann::es in em-
Ir il 
!I 
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il 
I! 
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I' !I 
II 
'I 1, 
li 
!I 
II 
II 
li 
II 
d 
'I 
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:J 
il 
!I 
II 
i1 
,, 
II 
il 
ji 
II 
II 
phasis have been discerned. Important chahges, with respect to. 
the problem of this thesis, are dealt with in the body of the 
thesis. 
Some of the \Vritings more sympathetic to the view of Royce 
which have proved to be helpful in the preparation of this the- : 
sis are the following: Blanshard, The Nature <?X Thoug:qt_, 2 Vol-: 
umes (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1948), Calking, The 
Persistent Problem!3 of Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, (1907)1910), and Smith, Ro;rce's __ §_oc~al _I.nfinite (New 
York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1950:. 
Some of the c:c>itical works on Royce w·hich are valuable 
with respect to the problem of this thesis are the follovling: 
Bowne, Theism (New YoDk: American Book Company, (1887)1902), 
Brightman, A P~il~~ophy of Religion (New York: Prentice Hall, 
II :! 
'I II 
il =======1t=·='~~=========================I=n=t=r=o=d=u=c=t=i=o=n=========== 
" ,: 
" 
H 
!I Inc., 1940), Rogers, English and American PhilosophY since 1800. 
li 
11 (New York: The Macmillan Company, (1922) 1928). 
3. The Method of the Thesis. 
The general procedure which is followed in this thesis is 
1) the exposition of the thought of Royce with consideration of 
historical development, and 2) the criticism of Royce's views 
which are relevant to the problem of the thesis. 
The order of the thesis is from the more general aspects 
of Royce's thought to the specific problem of the thesis it-
self. The method used by Royce bas been considered of basic 
importance. The over-all metaphysical view has been examined 
prior to the exposition, evaluation and criticism of the spe-
cific factors which are especially important to the problem of 
evil itself. 
3 
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Chapter I 
THE METHOD USED BY ROYCE. 
1. Royce, an Empiricist. 
It is important to know the method by which a conclusion 
: is reached. For instance, the traditional empiricist earnestly 
seeks truth by way of sense experience alone. His exclusive 
; way is the delimiting of both the area of his endeavor and the 
object of his se~rch. The rationalist, on the other hand, cir-
cumscribes truth within the area of eternal and necessary prin-
ciples which are external to the fact of sensory experience. 
The "thorough-going empiricist," however, is unable to abstract 
, any factor, whether it be axiom or sense perception, from what 
!: he defines as "experience." Experience is "all that is at any 
time present in consciousness. ul Royce seems to be a 11 thorough-'; 
!! 
1
1 
going empiricist." :. ii ., 
!· 
However, neither the radical empiricism of James, nor trad-il 
II 
1 itional empiricism, according to Royce, takes sufficient ac-
count of that which is the most significant element of reality, 
·· the individual. James, with his 
:1 1. Brightman, POR, 3. Knud-
,, son has clearly stated the 
basic distinctions between 
"traditional for sense em-
piricis~ and inclusive em-
piricism. Empiricism has 
erred in limlting knowledge 
to sense experience. This 
radical empiricism, assid-
is not true of empiricism 
as a whole nor does it 
necessarily inhere in em-
piricism as such." Knud-
son, POP, 394, cr. 387-397. 
Royce does not use the term :
1 
"experience" in the Kantian 11· 
sense. Calkins, PPP, 435. !
1 
4 
i! 
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' I 
1 
uously attempts to avoid the problems involved in consciousness. !: 
;'And in so far as he denied the unity of_ the conscious exper-
11 iencer, he denied the possibility of any experience. Royce, hoWo1! 
!l i[ 
ever, will not recognize any experience, whether of facts or re-j 
·lations, except as they are experiences of individuals. Exper-
, ience of an object is never pure experience. Only the mystic 
!i has rights to the claims of pure experience. "What is usually 
·called 'experience' is not purely immediate content, and is not 
whatever happens to come to hand, it is carefully attentively 
'selected experience 112 of an individual. "All knowing js, in a 
·• very deep sense, ••• creation, n3 in which the 11 confused hum of 
, voices" of the sense world are organized into a whole of exper-
:ience by our prejudices. 4 We favor "regularity, necessity and 
I 
simplicity in the world and so we constantly manipulate the data:! 
• of sense." 5 In the very search for truth which we have not yet f: 
d 
' ~ 
! found, the search itself becomes "the partial embodiment of what !i 
·I 
',we ourselves will. 116 The given in sense are "mere dead impres- I 
i sions" which we turn "by our own act into symbols of a real uni- ,! 
.f 
·:verse £an<!J ••• not only modify it, but even give it whatever sig-: 
i: nificance it comes to possess. 117 Thus, the individual is the 
j, 
1 1. "To be radical, an empiri- 2. Royce, WI, I, 285. (All 
cism must neither admit into future references in foot-
its construction any element notes are to Royce, unless 
that is not directly exper- otherwise noted. f""tt ienced. For such a philo- 3. WI, I, 284. 
sophy, the relations that 4. WI, I, 284. 
connect experienced rela- 5. RAP, 322. 
tions, and any kind of re- 6. WI, II, 2. .1 
lation experienced must be 7. RAP, 321. At this point, , ~~" ~~"~"t· .,li~:r:;n:~~;~~ ~J-·~fu:·~~-JU£~n~;!i&Uf~!s~g~~-~"-~~~~~ 
!I 
ij 
!I 
i\ 
:! 
,, 
ii The Method Used by Royce 
ll 
:1 subject of all experiencing for Royce. 
~ ! 
2. Implications of Self-Consciousness. 
i. Logical Meanings Involved in Experience. Royce, how-
,I 
:[ever, does not desire to state merely the psychological aspects 
i 
:;or consciousness, but is also interested in the implications of 
iJ 
', 
:i consciousness. "Any interpretation of experience involves at 
~ I 
i: 
II once a recognition of the facts of experience and a considera-
1 
1! 
1
1 tion of their logical meaning. Sooner or later, psychology and 
ll philosophy must join hands afresh. 111 
ii ii. Universal Principles of Thought or Scepticism. "Expe-
l 
:r rience jSens~ of itself can give no certainty about general 
d 
'l 2 l! principles. 11 Such principles must be brought to sense expe-
: 
·1 rience by the mind itself. But the problem, "Why these prin-
'1 
[! ciples and no others ? 11 which is counted 11 inexplicable" by Kant, 
1
1 becomes the starting place of the absolutism of Royce. If the 
:i 
:· 
!I principles of thought, which, united with the material of sense, 
,, 
:I "make things appear, 11 are no more certain than the f~ct that 
tl they are present in experience, how may we know 11 ~riori that 
;I 
II our a priori principles must always remain sucb? 113 We may only 
il 
;i postulate the continuity of the uniformity of nature in the 
'I i: future. "Thus, one reaches a scepticism as nearly complete as 
i! is possible to anyone with earnest activity of thought in him. 114 ll 
:! But Royce then goes one step further. "If everything beyond 
I 
i 
the present is doubtful, then how can even that doubt be pos-
1. SGE, xi. 3. RAP, 387. 
6 
q 2. RAP, 386. 4. RAP, 389. 
- 11 ...... .. · :=c..e-=o=::.:=..=.;·:=-o==--===--'-'-c=c-~~·cc:cc.-.-.=·.--".'=~~·~"-""-""cc .... .-;-,. . ..... ~:; :.=oc.c .. -;c • .c;. _ _.;j,.-..::=·==-~·= 
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The Method Used by Royce li 
'I 
i: 
I 
sible? 111 Doubt involves conditions which give it logical pos-
sibility and which transcend the momentary experience. The 
doubt implies the falsity of the statement which is doubted. 
We may be in error concerning all except the momentary experi-
ence itself. 
Royce is now ready to trace the logical conditions of the 
I' 
:! possibility of error. 
II 
il 
Only judgments can be false. Single 
II q q 
!I 
r !I !; 
il 
il 
i\ 
./ 
II 
II li 
:! p 
II 
II 
i\ 
... 
I' i! 1: 
i! 
l! 
\I 
!I g 
I' 
II 
ideas are neither true nor false. Falsity is disagreement of 
idea with intended object. "A judgment has as object only v1hat 
It has to conform only when it it intends to have as object. 
wants to conform. But the essence of an intention is the lmow-· 
ledge of what one intends." 2 An object is intended only when 
it is known, at least partially. Blanshard writes: 
The fu~l character of what one refers to is never 
known at the time of the reference ••• The develop-
ment of my thought of the object into fuller con-
creteness, under the dominance of logiv, pressing 
always for completeness and consistency, requires 
the continuous revising ang rejecting of notions 
entertained along the way. 
iii. Universal Mind Implicit i~ Universal Principles. i; 
il 
l.ll Then Royce considers the problem of how the terms of a prop-
osition, i.e., idea and object, may be related. They cannot 
It 
\j 
II 
:i 
ii· II 
be related if time is divided into separate compartments of 
past present and future. They may only be related in an all 
inclusive insight which comprehends all of the moments of time. 
1. RAP, 389. 2. RAP, 397. 3. Blanshard, NOT, I,5J2.i 
'i 
': 
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The Method Used by Royce 
When one says, "This color now before me is red, 
and to say that it is blue would be to make a 
blunder," one represents an including conscious-
ness. One includes in one's present thought three 
distinct elements, and has them present. in the u-
nity of a single moment of insight. These ele-
ments are, first, the perception of red; secondly, 
the reflective judgment whose object is this per-
ception and whose agreement with the object con-
stitutes its own truth; and thirdly, the errone-
ous reflection, this is blue, which is in the same 
thought compared ·with the perception and rejected 
as error.l 
'i i: Error is thus possible only as a moment of a larger truth of a 
:! 
II 
'I ,, single conscious moment. It is incomplete thought which, with 
'I il 
'I its truth, is included in a higher mind. 
il II And since error is 11 possible, not only as to objects, but 
!i as to the relations of objects, 112 the single conscious being 
,, 
ii 
:I 
I! 
must include all relations. Error is infinitely possible. The 
I' 
II 
!1 
H 
World Experiencer is thus also infinite. The implications of 
self-consciousness, aeeording to the investigation of Royce, 
therefore, lead to an absolute consciousness. 
!i 
II ~~ 3. Absolute Pragmatism. 
'i !, 
~ ; i! i. The Problem of_ Intellectualism. The most pressing 
I! !I criticism of absolutism by William James was its barren charac-
,, 
II ter as intellectualism, i.e. the unempirical Absolute. The 
!i 
'1 '1radical ~Mpiricism" of James was an attempt to avoid the pit-
il il il fall of the Absolute Relater. 
;I 
Royce is unwilling to concede that his view is intellec-
1. RAP, 423. 2. RAP, 425. 
8 
'I I
!i 
,, 
. il 
!i 
" I! 
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The Method Used by Royce 
tualism. His basic answer to the criticism is an appeal to his 
adherence to voluntarism. In fact, in his presidential address 
at the third annual meeting of the American Philosophical Asso-
ciation in 1903, he shows that the implication of pure pragma-
tism is absolute voluntarism, i.e. that both voluntarism and 
absolutism ar implicated in experience. 
He begins with the general epistemology of pure pragmatism, 
and recognizes that he (as well as his philosophical opponents) 
is more or less a post-Kantian empiricist. 1 "Objects are not 
given to us whole with all their properties and relations as 
,: objects independent of our will."2 That which is directly and 
immediately given is "simply the fact of our special momentary 
need for further insight and for further action." 3 Objects 
possess positive character "only in so far as we ourselves co-
operate in the construction, in the definition, in the linkage 
of those very predicates which we then ascribe to the objects.1.., 4 
The independence of the objects is subject to one's need, and 
conditioned by the perceiving individual's categories, and 
"modes of activity."5 That which is the structure of the ob-
je.ct and that which gives it its necessary characteristics is 
the construction of the individual who brings his needs to it. 
Realism sunders the object and individual while this pure prag-
matism unites object and individual in need. 
llD. 
122. 
122. 
4. Art.(l904), 123. 
5. Art.(l904), 123. 
---.. -: 
9 
The Method Used by Royce 
Pragmatism seems, when stated in this way, to spell plu-
ralism. 
Can such a realm be the expression of any truth 
that is either eternal, or absolutely authorita-
tive? You have your needs, I, flline •. ,"This belief 
of mine is true" fitay also be expresse<U "This bel 
lief of mine just now meets my conscious needs. 11 
But at this point, Royce notes one need, the need for companion-
II ship, or the need for agreement, which need is a problem to 
!i pure pragmatism. 
:I 
ii. Absolute Logically Involved in Pure Pragmatism. The 
,, 
n 
of anoought in society, i.e. people ought to agree with 
11 need 
il me, is as basic and essential an 11 empirical fact, a brute datu.~': 
jl 2 
i' as any other. 
il 
For instance, Royce notices that would-be pure 
II 
11 pragmatists often assert "that philosophers ought to take es-
i! 
' !I pecially careful account of that greatest of modern discover-
li ies--the doctrine of evolution. 113 Now, it may be the need of 
~~ an individual to believe in this doctrine, but this is as far 
,, ii as pure pragmatism may go. The truth of the doctrine of evolu-
ii 
! il tion cannot be an individual truth, the product of a personal 
li 
:1 need. "He needs that we shall find ourselves needing what he II 
!j needs. 114 An "ought" concerning the relationship of this indi-
!1 
li vidual and all individuals is included within the assertions 
li 
:f 
ii of pure pragmatism. The needs of the individual, therefore, 
II cannot be denied as constructive of reality, but "the need of 
1
1. Art.(l904), 125~126. 3. Art.(l904), 127. 
2. Art.(l904), 126. 4. Art.(l904), 129. 
10 
:j 
li 
-- ::~-===:~=:::-~....:::.-·~:;:~~-·..:-::=.· . .::.:..-=: .. 
The Method Used by Royce 
the moment needs control by another th~n itself, yet by some-
what that is not alien to itself. 111 
This problem may be res_tated as follows: Each judgment 
i/ _believed to be true by 
i! 
its author implies two other facts: 1) 
point of view than his own is possible, ,. that another conscious 
if i and 2) that these points of view are supplementary rather than 
:! 
'I 
,, identical. The judgment of an individual is not complete, but ii 
;! is extended in his O\'ffi "alter ego to aid its ovm expression. 112 
Ji 
:! Individuals, in this way, view themselves as essentially par-
" 
tial functions in a process whose unity is subject to one rule, 
ii 
;i 11 the ought of the truth-seeking activity, whose object is this 
!j 
i! 
:1 identical object, but whose variety is the actually required 
'I 
variety of points of view regarding this one object. 113 Unity 
cannot be achieved in a mere ought, but only in an ought which 
is consciously representative of all of the partial judgments 
of individuals. If a judgment is true or false, it is true or 
false upon the foundation of a completely conscious self. The 
multiplication of individual judges cannot help. 4 Royce has 
attempted to avoid the charge of intellectualism by emphasizing 
'I the essential elements of voluntarism, which, upon comprehen-
:j 
:1 sive analysis, require a unifying consciousness. He begins 
i/ with neither "beatific vision" nor mental constructs but rather 
,,i 
jl 
I 
with the individual~s need. 
1. Art.(l904), i51: 
2~ Art.(l904), 136. 
3. Art.(lm94), 136,137. 
4. In Chapter II, the impor-
tance of this will be consid-
ered with respect to Royce's 
criticism of realism and val-· 
idity • 
11 
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1i The Method Used by Royce 
4. Empirical Investigation of Evil 
i. Empiri~al Appro~ch to Frontier Problems. 
Patient, empirical, objective, utterly unsqueam-
ish, he fRoyce] faced the issue of social inter-
pretation in such a way as to cast grave doubt on 
the often regeated opinion, more or less traceable 
to James a~d Santayana, that he was among the ten-
derminded. 
Some of the most evident elements of this character are seen in 
his second book, California, from the Conquest of 1846 to the 
Second Vigilance Committee in San Francisco, A Study of American 
Character (1886). Reason and confusion are both recorded with 
i little attempt to reduce one to the other. "Strength and weak-
:ness" both mark the Californian. 11 Social irresponsibility ••• 
!I 
i provincial prejudice, ••• [and, in general,1 love for mere full-
~ 
!J ness of life, and a lack of reverence for the relations of life," 
:1 as "~JYell as a certain loyalty mark the general character of the 
d 
" 
'I frontier society. 2 
'I 
·' .,
ii. Em£irical Approach to the Problem of Evil. This char-
' ii acteristically empirical approach is evident on every hand in 
!I 
:I 
1
1 Royce 1 s treatment of evil. For instance, he begins v.ri th an 
i 
.: analysis of the individual experience of evil and pursues the 
'I 
!j implications of that experience. This procedure is evident in 
,! 
' 'his treatment of Chapter I;· :'The ;:Problem of Job, 11 in Studies of 
!IGood and Evil. 3 He begins with the particular evils of Job's 
:I 'i _______ _ 
II 
!il. Townsend, PJ:, 163. 
~'==cc=c==t==="-'-~-=-=,=·===c::=-==- ·.:.=:-~c-- .. 
\', 
!I 
2. GAL, 499. 3. SGE, 1-29. 
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The Hethod Used by Royce 
life.l He next recognizes the complexity of the awareness of 
2 
evil in the human consciousness. Here are revealed opposing 
elements, "conflict, and the complex inter-relations of loves 
3 
and hates, of attractions and repugnances." 11he tension of 
opposing forces is the essence of life. The Absolute Being it-
self is viewed by Royce "not as the infinite one beyond the fi-
nite imperfections, but as the being whose unity determines the 
very constitution of the lack, the tension, the relative dis-
harmony of the finite world. 114 Evil and good are abstract ternB 
except as they are folU1d in the individual experience of finite 
persons and God. In experience there is no goodness except as 
evil in the lives of God and man, and 
if the love of God is more inclusive than the love 
of man, even as the divine world of ex~erience is 
richer than the human world, we can simply set no 
human limit to the intensity of conflict, to the 
tragedies of existence, to the pangs of finitude, 
to the degree of moral ill which in the end is in-
cluded in the life that God not'only loves 5 but finds the fulfilment of the perfect ideal. 
Job rebelled because he conceived God to be an external 
sovereign. The solution to his problem lay, according to Royc~ 
' in the assurance of the immanence of God. "God here sorrowS' 
not with but in your sorrow." 6 God's "triu..'Tiph and peace" are 
the fulfilment of the finite experience. Victory or solution 
does not lie in the avoiding of conscious factors, but rather, 
1. Cf. SGE, 3, ff. 
:
1 
2. SGE, 19 • 
3. SGE, 23. 
4. SGE, 25. 
5. SGE, 25. 
6. SGE, 26. 
'I 
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The Method Used by Royce 
in giving each factor of consciousness due recognition and in 
rising auove them to the conscious Being -vvhich includes, as its 
' very reason, the elements of the problem itself. 
5. Conclusion. 
Royce is an empiricist, according to the wider usage of 
the term, experience. The real may be defined as that which is 
experienced. However, the difficulty with Royce's appeal to an 
.. absolute experience which James recognized was the inclusive 
!1 
!! ~ character of the absolute experience, or the problem of episte-
11 mological monism. Having found the satisfaction of the human 
II need in an absolute being, one has also found the ansvier to all ·.· 
I! 
n il problems. "If rationality be i:h [the world] at all, it must 
!I be in it throughout; if irrationality be in it anywher-~, that 
also must pervade it throughout."l James speaks of this as the 
11 beatific vision" of the absolute idealist. 
1. James, PU, 67. 
14 
Chapter II 
THE WORLD ORDER 
In this chapter the relationship between the individual 
and the world will be briefly sketched, with special emphasis 
on factors relevant to the problem of evil. The order of pro-
cedure with Royce is empirical. He begins with an investigation 
of the individual. For instance, in discussing the search for 
the individual ultimate, he asserts: 
If you want to find out ••• what is right, and what 
is good for you, bring your own ~ill t6 self-
consciousness.' Your duty is what you, yourself, 
~ 
will to do in so far as you clearly discover who 
you are and what your place in the world is.l 
1. Self-realization. 
i. The Idea of Self-realization in Royce's Writings. In 
several of Royce's works he has devoted individual chapters to 
the problems related to self7consciousness. The essays, Studies 
;n Good and Evil {1898), contain several chapters on this prob-
lem: e. g. ch. 6, "The Implications of Self-consciousness;" cb- 8, 
"Consciousness and Nature;" ch. 9, "Originality and Conscious-
ness." The Gifford Lectures of 1900-012 represent the material 
in a more systematized form: e.g. ch. 4, "Physical and Social 
Reality;" ch. 5, "The Interpretation of Nature;n ch. 6, "The 
1. WI, I, 341. 2. WI, II, 153-279. 
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II il Human Self; tt ch. 7, "The Place of Self in Being• ~~ 
i ii. The Social Aspect of Self-realization. The idealistic 
i 
,!world view of Royce is evidenced in the importance which he 
I 
places upon the alter in his analysis of the self. The inuiv-
:idual is not a self-existent real being whose perfection is the 
i 
' 
!assimilation of external truths, but self-realization is a pro-
! cess in which the individual finds the truths of his own being 
I 1to be external only in so far as he has not completely realieed 
I 
11 
them. He notes that no individual "comes to self-consciousness 
li except under the influence of his social fellows. 111 By a pro-
ljcess of imit~tion of parents and friends the infant identifies 
I himself as unique. He is first ·conscious of the lives of others~1 
I! 
li and secondly conscious of himself. Gradual social models are ,, 
I 
!adopted as life organization is effected. The constant inter-
1 
/!play of the more subjective consciousness of particular self andi! 
II of social environment are interwoven into a complex pattern 
II which is called the empirical self. The two constituent factors 
1: 
I! are ego and alter. The altar is 
i 
' 
viewed as a mass of experienced facts, the words, 
looks, and deeds and the ideas of other people; ••• 
[while the ego_? is centered about the relatively 
constant organic sensations Ljrhich are th~ .. social 
contrast-effects ... /Of.J inner and outer experience 
which I recognize as my own, just because it sharp-
ly differs from the experience of any of the rest 
of mankind. 
The individual thus tends to keep ego and alter separate, 
1. WI, II, 261. 2. WI, II, 264. 
i 
I 
I 
II 
ll 
II 
II 
II II ! 
I 
I 
! 
I 
I 
II 
I 
I, 
I 
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The World Order 
although the one is constituted by the other and finds its ex-
istence in the other. Royce is unable to find any cogency in 
realistic theories of the self, i.e. Descartes' cogito, etc. A 
knowledge of _the self is essentially recognition of the contras~; 
:: 
between ego and alter rather than an intuition of an independent! 
;i 
real or substantial object. 
The self, as such, sets itself apart as an existent fact 
to be judged by the community of selves which give it meaning. 
It is contingent ~n the community. 
Royce develops his doctrines of. community and absolute 
upon the basis of the implications of inner and outer aspects 
of the individual conscious life. 
2. The Idea of Community. 
The germ idea of community is present in all of the writ- :i 
ings of Royce. The concept grows in importance in his writings ! 
I. 
until it becomes the central theme of his last great work, The 
Problem of Christianity, (1914). The different aspects of the 
,I 
:I 
community are developed according to the purpose of the work in·' 
which the theory is found. 
i. The Idea of Co~unity in the PhilosoE~Y of Loyaltz. 1 
':Phe community theory in the Philosophy_ of Loyalty is an attempt , 
to provide a foundation for the spirit of loyalty. 2 Loyalty is 
the character of the search of the individual for self-realiza- 1\ 
" II 
,I 
tion. As such it is the principle of organization. :I The indiv - !1 jl il 
1. The 1:rroblem of "Loyalty and 
Evil will be considered in chapter 5 ~ 
11 Moral Evil". li 2. Smith, RSI, v5. ~ 
-------- ==~=== 
I 
I 
I, 
I! 
II 
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11 
!I 
idual who has not become loyal to some cause is so far inarticu-" 
late in his .striving for self-realization. It is true that 1h e 
The 
very search for one's true self is already a sort · 
of life-purpose, which, as far as it goes, indiv-
iduates the life of a person in question and gives 
him a task. But loyalty bringi the individual to 
full moral self-consciousness. 
social order "controls" while it "influences" self-will. 
It gives the individual hit-or-miss organization, but can give 
no solution to the "ultimate problems of life."2 The conflict 
of inner and outer orders can be quelled only by an appeal to 
1! 
that which gives reason to self-will in its very self-assertion.,! 
:I Society, in general, is thus conceived as the author of a rat- ,~ 
ional cause for the individual. 
The community is not an external order which imposes its 
authority upon the individual. The individual must freely sub-
i scribe ·to the cause of his loyalty. He must make it his own. 
I 
i 
,, 
li 
II 
I! 
II 
I 
I 
I 
I 
In this, Royce has recognized the Kantian principle, i.e. the 
"autonomy of the moral will." The will is the principle of in-
dividuation, and, while the individual in isolation can never 
conceive a rational plan, the plans given by society await the 
concurrence of his will or they remain abstractions for him. 
The paradoxical character of this situation is readily 
seen. The knowledge of the individual will may be found only 
by consulting the individual will itself. But the individual 
1. POL, 172. 2. POL, 58. 
The World Order 
But even in the act of imitation there 
Our own "self-will" is assertive in all' 
The plans which are suggested are interpreted ac-
cording to new interests, and new plans are formed and·a new 
, will developed. 3 The individual will, therefore, is never lost 
I' I' 
tl in the society which organizes it. In fact, it may completely 
'I 
' rebel against its teacher, 
1f Loyalty to the principle of lVYalty has been proposed by 
!! 
!! Royce to solve this living paradox. It shows 11 us outside of 
i\ 
ii ourselves the cause which is to be served and inside of ourselv~: 
II 
H 
\\ the will which delights to do this service. 114 Causes may in 
t: li themselves be contrary to the principle of loyalty which they 
I! 
i! require of the loyal. The cause of the loyal robber band is 
J! antithetical to the very nature of the principle of loyalty it-
d 
!I 1! self. But loyalty to the principle of loyalty (loyalty to loy-
~~ 
\alty) is evidenced in loyalties, whether the causes are good or 
1---~-
li 
ifl. POL, 31. in the chapter. See the 
112. POL, 32. section, pp. ;:ss - 45; 11 The 
\
1
!
1
3. The relationships of will V/ill, the Principle of In- ,'I 
and intellect will be more div~dua-11-ion 11 • 
\! completely dealt with later ...... ill :1 d 4. POL, 42. !J 
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The unity engendered by a loyal community is, in itself, 
Ia good. Royce, however, cannot conceive causes which are self-
1 
1
1 
destructive, or enemies .of the principle of loyalty, to be ulti-
1 lmate. The true cause of loyalty should be the principle itself 
li which may be embodied in concrete causes. Loyalty, when it is 
~~loyalty to the principle of loyalty itself, is never an evil. 
I Loyalty to loyalty is the summum bonum, the supreme virtue. The:, 
I concrete causes of loyalty are to be judged in the light of this!: 
I supreme principle. Causes which infringe the propagation of thel! 
I : loyalties, i.e. aggressive warfare, causes which do not specif-
1 
i ically engender more loyalty, or make loyalty more universal 
are unworthy causes of loyalty. This is, in general, a restate-:: 
ment of Kant's principle: 
Always act so that you can will the maxim or 
determining principle of your action to become 
universal law: act so that you can will that 
everyonl shall follow the principle of your 
action. 
The community theory as it is developed in the Philosophy 
I of LolaltY is important as the agent which introduces the su~ 
'! preme value (loyalty to loyalty) of life, thus aiding the proc-
1 ess of self-realization. 
I 
I 
ii. ~_:eistemology ~nd Community. Before a complete analysis:! 
.f 
~ of the conception of community is possible, a transition which 
took place in Royce 1 s epistemology must be considered briefly. 2 
1
: 
I! 
1. Thilly, HOP, 423. ical considerations are il 
2. For idealism, epistemolog- p:rior to metaphysical con- il 
===:===41===-=-=--=-=-,.-====·-===-== ·'===-=====~s"='~~d:::ce::,:r~a~t~i;;o~n~s~.==c- ~. ~=-=il==!l=,. === 
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II 
11 1) In his earlier works, thought was defined in the terminology ·
1 
II 
II 
II 
II II 
ll 
li 
II 
I 
ij 
I, 
II 
II 
II 
li 
I! 
II 
,j 
I' 
I 
I 
!I 
II d 
II 
I! 
·I 
l1 
I 
II 
of the meaning of ideas. "Starting (after the manner of Brit-
ish empiricism) with finite ideas ••• [heJ finds that they posses~ 
an internal and external meaning. 111 And the problem of epis-
temology is the proper relating of the internal to the outer 
order of reality. 2) In the Prob~e~ ~f Cgri~tJani~, Royce 
p~oposes a new triadic scheme in which the three terms 1) self 
A, 2) self B, and 3) interpreter constitute a community of in-
terpretation. His theory of knowledge is given more social sigt 
nificance. 
1) Royce criticises three of the contemporary theories of 
his day in The World and the Individual, Volume I, on the basis:! 
of their epistemological inadequacies. His own theory is more 
clearly seen with the problems which whese other theories faile4 
to solve. These three theories are i) realism, ii) mysticism, 
and iii) critical rationalism. \Vhile each of these theories 
agrees that some characteristics must be shared by both ideas 
and their objects, Royce observes some specific lack in e~ch of 
the theories in actually solving the problem of the sceptic. 
i) Realism holds that the object of knowledge is an in-
dependent real. Reconciliation of idea and object is of par-
amount importance. The 1wha~of individual experience is de-
1. a system for inference or Perry, PRR, 138. The "con-
ception of a functmonal re-
lationship between what he 
calls the 'exte~nal' and 'in-
ternal' meanings of ideas" 
what has been called a " 
u concrete universal". ( Cre~ 
ton, etc.). Cunn:j.ngbarp., i[ 
is Royce's presentation of 
Art.(l950), 324. II 
I! 
!I 
__ J 
--- - i --- . r 
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fined in em:r:-irical terms, but the "that" ,or the essence of the r: 
object,is defined "in realistic terms, namely, as a form of 
being indepe,ndent of our ideas, in so far as these ideas refer 
'i 
to the re~lity of our experience. nl The experience of the 1'thatqi 
in so far as it is defined in general and not individual terms 
is not real in the Roycean sense. Kant's dictum, "Nur in der 
Erfahrung ist Wahrheit," is accepted wholeheartedly by Royce. 2 
Realism has neglected the essential truth of empiricism, i.e. 
that "only individual experience is real, be that the experienc~ 
of man or God. 113 
ii) Mysticism, with its desire for com:r:-lete identity of 
idea and object, overlooks the finite, incomplete character of 
ideas and ends in unintelligibility. In the 11night in which 
all cows are black," no lmowledge is possible. 
iii) Critical rationalism, which holds "that ideas express:, 
with varying precision the truth which is to be valid beyond 
them," 4 has committed the fallacy of giving possibility the 
characteristics of reality. Possibility, in truth, does not 
exist. The principle of critical rationalism is that of val-
idity. If an idea is valid, future experience will constitute 1: 
that validity. But if such future experience is merely Kant's 
~8gliche Erfahrung, all that is defined concerning the bbject, 
f" as is true with realism, is "whatness 11 , or present experience 
at the ti~e of definition. 
1. WI, I, 363. 3. WI, I, 363. 
2. WI, I, 362. 4. WI, I, 350. 
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The World Order. q 
Each of these theories, evidently, has failed to arrive at:i 
reality as more than a static mental concept. The object of 
knowledge is never reached in.any w~y by the finite idea. 
Royce recognizes that realism is partially correct, howeve~ 
in asserting the truth that the object is not present in the 
finite idea, -- but something of the object must be experienced~! 
Mysticism is correct, on the other hand, in asserting that the :: 
II 
'! 
object must be experienced. The common ground is the true epis+ 
:I ,, 
temological formula. Some of the object is experienced in fin- ·l ;: 
:I 
i' ite knowledge. Therefore, the individual idea is part o~ a comt 
plete self-conscious being who knows each idea and its proper 
intention and whose knowledge is the correcting reality of all 1: 
imperfect thought. It corrects by fulfilling the intention of 
all ideas. Each idea, according to this view, has a will which:j 
chooses its object as that which already embodies its object, 
at least in part, and is only satisfied in its object. 
We have already taken account of the importance of com-
munity in the presenting and correcting of ideas. 
2) The theory of interpretation is considered by Royce to 
be merely "a new mode of approach to the very problems [which 
he haW formerly discussed. 111 The fundamental epist..emological 
problem was that of perception versus conception. 2 
d 
Interpreta- il 
~ ! 
:! ··--·----
1. POC, II, 295. 
2. Some attention has been 
given to this in Chapter I, 
"The Method Used oy Royce." 
In his major works, the 
problem is treated. Espec-
ial importance is gi ~~en to 
the subject in SRI, Ch. 3, 
"The Office of Reason. 11 
--=-===#===cc=== --- ~------ ---- -- -----~ - ~----~ .. 
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tion is temporal and social process. 
i) At the heart of the theory lies the Roycean doctrine 
~ of time. 1 The three terms used are elements of the temporal 
world. The past is interpreted to the future by the present. 
The present, without the past memory which is interpreted to 
the future, would be without meaning. The self is thus the 
" 
'I 
il 
--tr 
if 
,! ,, 
~ I 
li 
![ 
product of interpretation. The individual at an isolated 
I' momen~l 
:! 
of existence (the present) is but a fragment. It is related to !I 
I! 
the irrevocable past by memory. Reflection is a "conscious in- II 
I 
terior conversation" wherein ·we interpret ourselves. "Both of il 
·i 
ourselves and of our neighbors, we have no merely intuitive 
knowledge, no complete perception, and no adequate conception. :i 
il 
Reflection is an effort at self-interpretation. 112 11 
Perception and conception are processes which terminate 
!I 
!I 
ii 
II 
in their objects. Perception seeks the particular; conception, i/ 
li 
the universal. When these are reached, the process is comple~j 
The most basic difference between this and the theory of inter- II 
pretation is that interpretation is an interminable process. 
Each interpretation when it is completed becomes, in turn, a 
sign or meaning which m~st be interpreted and so on ad infin-
itum. This "endlessness of a determinate infinite" is that 
1\ [! 
I< 
il I, 
II 
ii 
,! 
I, 
ii 
1! 
which Royce had formerly empb.asized in the self-representative li 
:r 
li system of the Supplementary Essay of ~he World and the Indiv-
II 
II 
II 
idual, Volume I. 3 
--------
1. This is treated later in 
the chapter. 
I 2. POC, II, 159. I 
3. Loewenberg, Art. (1916), 193.
1 
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It is readily seen that no departure from his earlier 
epistemology is e~fected by his new medium of expression, in-
terpretation. The fuller implicationsof the community aspect 
of his epistemology are predominant. I! 
:j 
:I 
ii) ''rhe triadic form of interpreaation makes of the know- 11 !I 
ledge of meanings a social enterprise."1 The individual thus 
never stands in isolation from the community. The memory, 
which he interprets as his own to his future intentions, is 
identifiable in many of its aspects with the memory of those 
I! 
ii 
'I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
:I 
<I 
il 
of the same community. il While the individual is not the indep- il 
!i 
endent real of the realist, he is also not merged into an in-
distinguishable unity of the mystic. He is rather united in 
the community, which is the significant truth of his life by 
I: 
II 
,, 
way of memory. Each member of a community "acc{'pts as part of [J 
[I' 
I, 
his own individual life and self the same past events that each 11 
ti 
of his fellow members accepts~12 Similar identity of life is 1! II 
1 made with respect to the future hopes as these past 
are interpreted to the futube. 
Interpretation "accompanies every intelligent converse.-
tion. It is used whenever we acknowledge the inner life of 
our fellow-men.u 3 But Royce is careful to lay down criteria 
of a true community of interpretation •. A community is a par-
ticular group. The criteria of a true community of interpre-
tation are as follows: First, it must 
--------------
l. Loewenberg, A nt. 2. POC, II, 50. 
9 6 
II I! 
II 
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I !time process. As such it will have a common past and a common 
I' future hope.1 Even as the self is not constituted by a moment 
,, of time, but rather as that which "comes down to us from its 
I 2 
'I own past" so the community is an organically related past of 
I ·experiences held by a specific group as its own. Secondly, a 
I true community of interpretation exists when "a number of dis-
1 
tinct selves faro/ capable of social connnunicatiori~ and in gen-
11 eral, are 
3 
engaged in communication." The third criterion of 
II I community is cooperation. But 
men do not form a community ••• merely in so far as 
they cooperate. They form a community ••• when they 
do cooperate, but accompany the cooperation with 
that ideal extension of the lives of individuals 
whereby they cooperate."4 
Deeds of cooperation must be identified by each member of the 
community with his own life. One more factor is essential to 
the true community: love. Love extends beyond the immediate 
1 bounds of intelligence which the community possesses and fur-
nishes a complete basis for mutual cooperation. 5 
Common memory and hope, the central possessions 
of the community, tend, when enlivened by love, 
to mould the consciousness of the present, to link 
each member to his own community by ideal ties 
which belong to the moment ~s w~ll as to the 
stream of past and future life. 
iii. ~ove_and the Bel<?Ved 9ommunity. Royce distinguishes 
1. POC, II, 3'7. 
2. POC, II, 40 
3. P08 , I I, 6'7 • 
4. Foe, II, 86. 
5~ POC, II, 92. 
6. POC, II, 95. 
l! 
ff' 
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I Christian ·love from "natural love". 
\ idenced in the case of family ties and patriotism is the "prod-
Natural love, which is ev-
!
,,, uct of our ordinary human nature."1 
lj often a blind drive. Its strength is greatest at the lower 
It is an instinctive and 
j: 
,I 
li ! 
I 
I 
ti 
II 
'I li 
II 
II 
II 
levels of civilization and intellectual attainment, i.e. tribal 
love, or love of the babe for the fa.mily. 2 Christian love or 
love for the Beloved Community, on the other hand, is contrary 
in its nature to the inclination of what Royce terms the "nat-
ural man." "It is the love that conquers us when we have be-
come enemies of the law. 113 The choice of the individual is jn-
volved in every instance. Such love, therefore, must begin 
I 4 i with a "miracle of grace 11 • Instinctive factors, therefore, 
I 
II 
I' 
!I 
are excluded, and the starting point of Christian love thus 
becomes a problem. 
Royce finds the origin of the Beloved Community as the 
"contagion of love 11 which follows upon the heels of the great 
example of love. 5 The apostle Paul refers the church back to 
11 Jesus Christ, who exemplifies love at its highest. "He both 
;i 
11 knew and loved his community before it existed on earth ••• he 
11 suffered and died that it might have life ••• He is now identical :1 !I 
[1 with this community." 6 Divine grace, according to Royce, is 
I 
ll 
I 
1. POC, II,lBO~ 6. POC, I, 187. One of the 
2. POC, I, 181. criticismsof Royce's inter-
3. POC, I, 181. pretation of Christianity 
4. Royce is an interpreter is "psychologically stated 
of Pauline Christianity --his undue subordination 
at this point. of the role of the leader 
5. POC, I, 185. to that of the group, or--
II 
\i 
li 
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initiated in this work of Christ, and in every individual life 
of the members of the beloved community. 
Love fort he beloved community is qualitatively distinct 
from any other loves. Singer has noted that loyalty is only 
the "half-way house ot1 the road to something better --which 
something better is love."1 Smith states; 
Love is loyalty and ultimarely it passes beyond 
understanding because it is able to perform what 
may be and often is impossible oft the level of 
understanding. Love turns the community into the 
Beloved Communi~y, which was for Royce the ulti-
mate community. 
Royce actually seems to equate love and loyalt~ with the stip-
ulation that the agap~ of the Christian community is of dis-
tinctly different character from the loves for ordinary commun-
ities, because of the element of grace which is always involved 
in it. His conception of love may be nearer to the agap~of 
modern nee-orthodox theology in which it is conceived as the 
existential ultimate. 3 
Perhaps the most important factor in the entire tteltan-
schauung of Royce for our consideration of the problem of evil 
is the beloved community. It 'fievelops, sustains, L'ang/ redeems 
the individual."4 The theory which was first presented in the 
historically stated--his 
underestimation of the fact 
also,·Brovm, Art. (1916), 
77-86.-
:I 
that the passionate loyalty 1~ 
to the person of Christ was 2~ 
the bond of unity in the ear- 3. 
Singer, MTP, 292. 
Smith, RSI, 76. 
Cf. Ferri, CAS, 12, 45, 
Also, POC, II, 96, ff. 
etc.'! 
I 
I ly Christian church." Cal-
kins, Art. (1916), 55~ See 4. Tsano~ MIG, 563. ! 
28 
The World Order 
Problem o~ Christian.:L.!z is· not a radical departure from pre-
vious writings on religious and ethical problems. 11 0n the con-
~ trary, fSmith asserts~ his earlier views are in accord with 
the theory of Beloved Community."1 
By the phrase, beloved community, Royce meant the "invis-
2 
ible church" of. traditional orthodox Christianity, which, al-
though it is never embodied completely in any specific church 
in any specific age, is partially embodied in each Christian 
church. 3 It is the ultimate community of interpretation in 
which the individual finds himself. Royce conceives this com-
munity of interpretation as the ideal o~ the divine nature, 
which is "the interpreter who interprets all to all and each 
individual to the world and the world of spirits to each in-
dividual.114 It is the perfect solution to the problem of the ii 
one and the many. 5 
This is the vision of 
God as the spirit dwelling in the beloved commun-
ity, a concept which in no wise resembles .. foe-
cording to Bakewell~ that spectre which the phil-
osophical caricaturist delights in portraying, the 
otiose absolute of. the schools.6 
Brown has revealed dissatisfaction with this interpretation · 
of Christianity by Royce, i.e. in identifying the "spirit of 
Christ with the spirit of the community, and both with God. 117 
---------
il 
d 
I 
:j 
i 
'l 
d 
II 
" I 
1. Smith, RSI, 126. 5. POC, II, 219. 11 
6. Bakewell, Art. (1916), 33. ii 
7. Brown, Art. (1916), 82. Cf. ;1 
POC, I, 202, 409. :1 
2. SRI, 277. 
3. Cf. POC, I, ch.2, 
4. POC, II, 219. ' 
49, ff. 
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This seel:I_lS 'to be a denial of the essential theism of Christian-
ity and of Royce in his former works. 1 The beloved community 
o~ universal community seems to be the absolute consciousness 
of Royce's earlier works. Before an intelligent answer concern-: 
I ing this problem may be ascertained, we must give some attentio~i 
'/ to the doctrine of the Absolute as it is presented throughout 
Royce's writings. 
3. The Concept of Absolute. 
i. Smith 1 s Analy~_~s _ of_~_he Dev~lopment _of Royce 1 ~ Absolute·!! 
Smith observes an important transition in the concept of 
1 Royce1Sl Absolute. In his earliest systematic work, The __ Relig-
ious Asp~~t of Philosophy (1885}, the Absolute is characterized 
'I 
'i 
as the. complete e~bodiment of the true and the good. The em- . (' ii 
phasis is placed on completeness. That which is merely i~tende~~ 
in the finite as its goal and perfection is realized in the ·. 
single moment of experience of the Absolute. The view of the 
,_/ Absolute is intli.itive, and "this is the distinctive feature of 
Royce's earlier view of the absolute self. 112 In the Spirit of 
Modern Philosophy (1893), the emphasis is sti-ll on the intui-
tive character of the absolute experience. But by the time 
Royce had written The World and the Indivi~ual _(1900), some 
change is observable in the concept. Emphasis is still on the 
~~tum simul aspect of the absolute knowledge, but a detailed 
account of the order and system is presented in the Supplemen~-
1. Brown, Art. (1916), 83. 2. Smith, RSI 1 16. 
II 
II 
,, 
II i! 31 
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ary Essay to the first volume. The importance of mediation as- il 
!; 
sumes characteristic pre8minance from this point, especially in ij 
II 
the concept of infinite system. Smith notes that is was throug~l 
I the influence of the logic of Peirce that Royce "ultimately camel! 
il 
to think of it, lthe Absolute J in terms of .an infinite commun- il 
I 
I 
ity."l i! 
II 
· ii. Theism or Pantheism. Miss Calkins, who is one of the !I 
I' ablest expositors of Royce, does not believe that Royce iden- 11 
!I I tifies "the absolute self with the universal community." 2 The I! 
·1 Absolute as totum simul remains distinct from the universal com-11 
munity although not separated from it. I' 
i' 
,I 
Miss Calkins notes first that Royce recognizes no essentialil 
I 
change in his "fundamental metaphysical thesis" in the intro- II 
'i 
He asserts his agreement II duction to the fhiloso~~ Loyalty. 
I' 
with his former idealistic thought in the Problem of Christian- i! 
II !El• In the Spirit of Modern Philosophy and in the Conception li 
il I 
If his analysis of his . !j 
!: 
of God he identifies himself a theist. 
own historical train of thought is correct, the immanent aspect lj 
of God (community) is not to be completely identified with the 11 
transcendent aspect, 3 the absolute self. :1 
il For the second phase of her argument, Miss Caliins dis-
cusses the essentials of theism, recognizing the difference be-
tween idealism and realism. 4 She finds that Royce's conception 
fluence of Peirce. POC, 
II, 139, ff. 
2. Calkins, Art. (1916), 59. 
!I 
1. We have already showed in 
the section ori &pistemology, 
the transition to the doc-
trine of interpretation, 
which Royce credits in 
large part, to the in-
3. Calkins, Art. (1916), 55. 
4. Calkins, Art~ (1916), 55~n t 
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of God resembles that formulated in the Westminster Catechism.1 
All of his writings recognize the personality of God although 
' the terminology of his last three works is different from the 
former terminology. 2 
However, the real problem as to the relationship between 
the absolut~ self and the beloved community lies in declarations 
that seem "to make the universal community equivalent to the 
self" of the former works. 3 He does qualify these statements 
with such assertions as "the divine life is expressed in the 
form of a co:mmunity," 4 and the nwhole real world is the expres-· 
sion of one divine process •• ~the process of the spirit."5 Vv'Hile 
God is contained in his church, or the beloved community, he is 
distinguished from it as "spirit, counsellor or interpreter." 6 
There is identity of God and creature, but never identity with-
out difference. 7 Traditional theism knows no identity, howeven 
It is worth noting that Royce's works are replete with 
statements which betray a quantitative metaphysical monism 
(pantheism). In Studies d~ Good and Evil he speaks of the 
finite world as that which is not a second re~lity to God, "but 
is God."8 In the World and the Individual God is the unity 
which ~includes this endless temporal process, and that con-
sciously surveys it as one life, God's own life." 9 
li 1. Calkins, 
1
1.' 2. Calkins, 
3. Calkins, 
I POC' II, 
Art.(l916~ 56. 5. 
Art.{l916), 58. 6. 
Art.(l916), 59. Cf. 7~ 
296, 281, 390, ff. 8. 
388. 9. 
POC, II, 373. 
Calkins, Art~(l916), 59. 
Calkins, Art.(l916), 63. 
SGE, 141. -
WI, I, 418. 
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Earlier, in the Rel_igious Aspect of Philosophy, he gave a de-
tailed proof of the theory that God is an infinite actor, iden-
~ ' tical with his works.l If an actual separation exists between 
God and his creative work, the success of that work demands a 
11 pregxistent law or power outside himself to explain it." 2 
Creative conditions must have existed whose existence even as 
created would be possible only upon a prior creation of condi-
tions for creation ad infinitum, or to an external and superior 
power to God himself. "Hence, either God creates nothing ex-
ternal to himself, or else, in creating, he works under the 
laws that pre-suppose a power higher than himself and external 
to himselr."3 Royce thus poses the dilemma of a finite God 
or an infinite actor who is identical with the world. 4 
In William James and Other Ess~~' the world is spoken of 
as God, 5 although he is conceived to be "infinitely more than 
any finite system of natural facts or of human lives can ex-
press."6 The Problem of Christianii?_~ is not essentially dif-
ferent in presenting the 
real world L'as_/ ••• a community of interpretation 
which is constituted by the authentic ideas and 
their mediator and interpreter ••• [tha~ if the 
1. RAP, 277, ff. 
2. RAP, 277. Cf. Hartshorne, 
MVG, 233 for a similar ar-
gument against creation 
ex nihilo. 
3. RAP, 233. 
4. This also applies to the 
creation of finite spirits. 
They cannot be created with-
out the ad infinitum con-
ditions. 
5. WJO, 169. 
6. WJO, 168. This is the form-
ulation of the panentheism 
of Hartshorne. 
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interpretation is a truth, 
the whole of reality, then 
its goal -- the real world 
prater. 
if it truly interprets 
this community reaches 
includes its own inter-
One way of ex-plication of many of the problems pertaining 
-· q 
to the one and the many in Royce 1 s philosophy is an analysis of Jl 
his doctrines of time and eternity. He asserts that "all the 
questions as to the deeper relations to the universe are bound 
up with this problem of time and eternity."2 
4. The Temporal and the Eternal. 
We know time both perceptually and conceptually. Our con-
ceptual knowledge of time is contingent on our perceptual know-
ledge. 
:: 
I' II 
II II 
II 
:I 
!i 
~ i 
'I 
II ,, 
II ,, 
1/ 
I' 
II ,, 
1-
,l 
,I i. The Perceptual Idea of Time. The metaphysical problems ,11 
!. 
I' in general, with the doctrine of time are the result of an in- ij 
h 
d adequate understanding of the psychological or empirical fac-
3 tors involved. Royce begins his analysis, therefore, with the 
temporal factors which are experienced by the individual him-
self. 
!I 
i! 
;j 
'I II 
!I 
II 
li 
The most common element of experience is change or "sue- !I 
, 'I 
cessive acts of attention. "4 1) A succession of events (change )~ 1 
il 1. POC, II, 269. Dr. Bright-
man speaks of this vein in 
Royce as "religiously pan-
theistic." Brightman, POR, 
141. Wieman speaks of him 
as a thorough-going absolut-
ist and mJstic. Because 
of the reality of persons, 
if not as independent beings~' 
Knudson has termed Royce's 1 
Weltanschauung, "panthe- l 
is tic personalism. n Art'• 1 ji ( 19q0 }, ~42. ![ 
2. trl, II, 151: 1; 
3. WI, II, 113. 
4. WI, II, 114. 
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II ~has a certain order. Direction of the events is always from A 
" H 
ij"to B and can never be reversed. 2) The entire series, i.e. 
!I 
li drumbeats or other simple events, is present at once to ou±t con-
:1 i! • i! SCl.OUSness • Thus, the preceding event is always past when the 
H !I following event is attained, yet the successive events are at-
,, 
ii il tended in a single present moment. For instance, words of a 
II 
II phrase are past before the succeeding words are spoken, yet the 
!i individual words are attended in their entirety as a phrase. 
I• I The essential character of experience of time vequires both of 
! 
1
these factors. Without the events in a series there would be 
;j a simple, unrelated, inapprehensible fact; and were there no 
rl 
lj perception of the series in their relatedness, the same imper-
Il ceptible character of the individual factors ·would exist. The 
1: 
!I perception of time is thus conceived by Royce as a span of con-
i' sciousness .1 
1. By far the most important factor involved in the concept of: 
jl 
II time is direction. It is because of this fact that Royce state~: 
I. 
il 
II 
ij 
!I 
!I 
\i 
lj 
Time is of the will and the real world is a tem-
poral world in so far as, in various regions of the 
world, seeking differs from attainment, pursuit is 
expernal to its goal, the imperfect tends towards 
its own perfection, or in brief, the internal 
meanings of finite life gradually win, in succes-
sive.sta~es, their union with their own external 
meanl.ng. 
'I 
II Organization and meaning are given by the "form of the will" 
Jj . ···-
I' 1: 
' • This is also called 11 spec-
ious present," 11 stream of 
consciousness" (James), 11sit-
uati6n expe:r;ienced11 (Bright-;, 
man). 
==:=. ---:_--_::;;~::_-==::'.~~-"- ----- • • ¥ 
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I' 
.11 (time) to the data of what is previously unorganized space. 
I 
lEach element in the specious present aims at self-extinction. 
I 
i! Our experience of time is thus for us essentially an experience 
11 of longing, or pursuit, or restlessness. 
I The percept~al or relatively direct experience of time is 
lthe basis or a comprehension or both time and eternity.1 
ii._Conc~I?_tual Jfnowledge of Time. "A mathematically indi-
Visible present time, possessing no length, is simply no time 
all. 112 Sequence is involved in every moment of experience. 
t ·i a ii 
ii 
Theli 
il 
present is never isolated from the moments now past which con-
stitute its being, and the t=mticipation of fubir·e Wllnts ,.v}dch 
direct its flow. The world's time is merely this psychological 
ii 
l 
fact translated into an eternal time-span, or present moment, q I 
which comprehends past, present and future, i.e. all succession. !J 
,i 
The irrevocable character of the past is not lost, nor is the 
!
uniqueness of future events denied. All reality, however, is 
1 
ii viewed as an eternal present or is a specious present which com- 'i 
!i 
!prebends all reality. 
I 
I The proximity of time and eternity is fubther expressed by 
'I II Royce in his analysis of progress. 
II 
Knowing as a process is dis- li 
" 
lltinguished from knowledge itself. Process is reality emerging 
I 1in the consciousness of the partially realized mind. To such, 
ii 
!j 
I 
., 
1! time is or central importance in growth but not to reality it-
11 self. Royce illustrates with a mathematical problem. The truth I[ 
----·-- ---
1. WI, II, 126. 2. WI, II, 12e. 
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of the solution emerges slowly to the finite consciousness but 
1no one would count this process to be progress in eternal know-
<~ 
ledge. 
In seeking its object, any idea whatever seeks ab-
solutely nothing but its own implicit and, in the 
end, complete determination as this conscious pur-
pose embodied in this one way. The complete con-
tent of the ideas's purpose is the only object of 
which the idea can ever take note.l I 
11 Idea to objecj;, immature self to satisfaction, "purpose to f'Ul-
' 
I filment are not temporal relations. 112 "The temporal passage is 
I 
I so invariably the vehicle through which the relation is preS'ente:3;: 
that we come to think of it as belonging to the relation."3 
I 
Royce is careful to point out that any theory of reality I 
II 
I! is in error which presupposes that progress in time is the es-
1 sence of "divine meaning, 11 while the theory that progress in 
1 time is only an accident of history, a non-essential feature of 
li [temporal reality, is morally meaningless. Eternal progress in 
I 
'I time implies "a beginning infinitely bad" or the impotence of 
1: progress to remove in an eternity of time the evil element. 
II li 
ii"Another infinity of progress is not certain to remove such im-
~~ perfections. " 4 Growth and decay are evident factors of a real-
11. WI, I, 521. such terms as purpose, tel-
2. Blanshard, NOT, I, 514. ,~ eo logy, fulfilled, end, etc.:: 
Blanshard, who follows Royce 
closely at this point, 
points out the problem of 
the inadequacy of the means 
o:f expression. "It must be 
admitted and emphasized that 
do carry in ord!nary use a · 
reference to time.H Elan-
shard, NOY, I, 515. 
3. Blanshard, NOT, I, 516. 
4. RAP, 248. 
il II 
l\ 
'I I ,I 
il 
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il ity 11 in which progress is an accident, not an essential feat-
~~~ 
I. q 
il 
1. 
i' I' 
li 
li 
!I 
:; 
I' 
,j 
,, 
il 
ure. 111 One aspect of the temporal order is temporal progress, 
2 but flowers wither and show no continuing progress. 
3 
and decay are parallel factors in the temporal world. 
Growth 
The 
world is known as progressive in so far as we are able to reach 
beyond the describable world of facts into the eternal world of 
The growth of the world is seen in as much as 
we are able to perceive the intrusion of the time order in the 
fulfilled reality of truth, the eternal order.4 
The concept of totum simul is the recognition of the imme~ 
iacy of knowledge which is involved in the absolute conscious-
ness. Pantheistic expeessions are the most adequate vehicles 
for such conceptions. Even as the entire system of Royce re-
volves about the concept of totum simul, most of the criticisms: 
of his system, either directly or indirectly, are directed 
against bhis aspect of his thought. His main attempts to meet 
the problems of a 11 block universe" are centered in h,is prin-
ciple of individuation. 
5. ·will, the Principle of Individuation. 
i. Historical Development of_ Absol~t~_ Vo.lrm._~arism. Royce 
:: struggles with the problem of intellectualism versus voluntar-li 
II ism throughout his works. He cannot find rest in either camp. 
1: 
'i 
II 1. RAP' 247. 
II 2. VII, I, 427. 
3. WI, I, 427. 
4. SMP, 423. 
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·I 
'I 
John Dewey has recorded the change of view from voluntarism to il 
li 
absolute voluntarism in "Voluntarism in Roycean Philosophy."1 ij 
i' 
Prior to the writing of the Religious Aspect C?f. Philosophy {18851~ 
:I 
the "voluntaristic and ethical side" was ultimate. Acts of will!\ 
,, 
;j 
were 11 self- justifying" and "no theoretical justification" could il 
be found. With the writing of the Religious Aspect of Philos- 11 
~~ however, "the ethical [waflj transcended in the cognitive.", 
jl 
"The moral worth of the will can be eatablished only on the basi$ 
I! 
II 
of an organized harmony of wills as an established fact. 11 3 
The reason for this radical transition to absolutism was 
through (a) discovery of the scepticism latent in 
voluntarism when th~t is made ultimate: {b) in the 
demand for a community of aims or organization of 
wills: (c) the discovery that all regognition of 
ignorance and error, all sceptical doubt involves 
an appeal to a Judger, or Thought which included 
both the origi~al object and the original judg-
ment about it. · 
Dewey goes on in his analysis of this change in Royce's 
philosophy to point out the essential relationship between the 
earlier and later v~ews. He notes that "voluntarism is not ••• 
superseded. 115 Royce's "World of Postulates" is not essentially 
different from the "acknowledging activity" of his earlier vol-
,, 
ii 
il II ,, 
ii 
il 
H 
I! 
ij 
'I li 
II 
!! 
!i ii 
II 
'I 
II 
II I; 
i: 
,I 
. I' 
untarism. 6 He removes the Kantian trans-empirical Ding-an-sich, 1! li 
however, to replace it with an Infinite Experiencer. 'rhis tran~ 
1. Dewey, 
17-26. 
2. Dewey, 
3. Dewey, 
Art. (1916}, 
Art. (1916}, 20. 
Art. {1916), 21. 
I. Dewey, Art. (1916), 22~ 
1. Dewey, Art. (1916), 22~ 
6. Dewey, Art. (1916), 22. 
ij 
:I 
!I 
i' 
II 
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1: 
II ition was logically necessary. Will must find a "rational meas-;1 
II ure of choice ••• a coordinated foresight ••• LQnq/ it must find it 
I! 
II in some pre-existing Reality. nl 
I 
I Two concepts are essential to Royce 1 s idea of will: 1) the 
I . 
1 psychological concept of attention for which he gives credit 
j to James2 and 2) the concept of appreciation. 
ii. Attention and Will. The uniting of knowledge and will 
in the concept of attention is an obvious attempt to avoid the •. 
li 
11As a man attends , 1! dilemma: voluntarism versus intellectualism. 
I' 
.I 
so he knows, aa.d so, too, he acts, or voluntarily refrains from !I 
3 
action." The will is no arbitrary factor which runs before 
knowledge. It is rather a running aftar that which the indiv-
idual conceivea to be truth. Socrates, according to Royce, haa 
already given the first sentence of moral philosophy in the 
I! principle, "Virtue is lmowledge. 114 By 11 lmowledge 11 Socrates 
;i 
•j 
q 
II 
'I ,, II 5 
meant "life directing conviction." 
much as human nature is bent toward 
11 If orte lmew the good in asll 
:1 
the good, he would attempt ·! 
1 to ~ttain it. tt 6 Royce is not entirely persuaded, however, that I! 
I human nature is entirely directed toward the good. Often he 
I whows a predisposition for the Calvinistic doctrine of deprav-
,1 ity. 7 An individual may attend considerably less than the wholell 
!I 
of truth, while no man ever attends the whole of truth, or At-
, tends positive error. 1-------- For instance, one may attend the idea 
1. Dewey, Art. (1916), 26. 
2. WI, II, 354. Cf. also 
"Method used by Royce, 11 
chapter I. 
4. Tsanoff, ETH, 132. 
5. Tsanoff, ETH, 132~ 
6. Tsanoff, ETH, 132. 
7. Cf., especially, SMP, 
41 
:: 
~,= cc--;t:o== 
The World Order 
of embezzlement until it possesses him. When the ideal moment 
for action bas arrived, he will carry out the deed of embezzle-
1ment.1 Attention not only involves a completed truth, but in 
p 
II so far as individual p~rspecti.~e must· be computed, the individual,! 
Ji· approach to that truth is also ~nvolved. Royce's doctrine of 
ii 
1i the possibility of error is fundamental here. 1) The whole 
l !truth exists in the conscious experience of an individual. 
i2) Error requires such an absolute existing standard; 3) there-
\fore, error of mortal mind does not invalidate an absolute truth 
lbut confirms it. 
Knowledge of the truth thus is not to be considered a re-
striction of freedom. In fact, it is the very ground of freedom·r 
for Royce. The ideal must exist in order that it may be at-
tended, known and practiced. 
Royce builds upon the Hegelian idea that actuality is prior 
to possibility. 2 Being and essence do not stand as limitations 
one to the other. They are aufgehoben in the freedom of one 
II 
self-derective notion; the freedom which "presupposes necessity. "1 
A ·free being has itself for its object, or is being unlimited 
by another. As such it is self-determined and free. A finite 
person is thus "most independent when he lmows himseJ.f to be 
determined by the absolute idea througbout. 114 Ignorance of the 
,., truth is the only necessity, i.e. "necessity is blind only so 
1. WI, II, 354. 
2. The concept is not new with 
Hegel, although his inter-
pretation of it is closer 
to that 'of Royce than any 
of his predecessors. 
3. Wallace, LOH, 283. 
4. Wallace, LOH, 283. 
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I 
II 1 jllong as it is not understood." Free will, according to Hegel, 
jjwhich includes feee choice as suspended, "recognizes the deter-
ilminateness to be thorc:>ughly, its own.112 
!I Royce seems to ,concur with Hegel on the essential features 
iloi' this doctrine. 1) Tru~h is absolute and in so far as both 
I 
jpast and future with the present are an eternal moment of the 
I 
I, divine life, the choice of the individual does not change future 
II 
!!temporal reality with bespect to the divine life. Royce does 
II 
l1note with respect to the doctrine of predestination that eternal 
iJ jjlmowledge, which is complete as :far as the future_ is concerned, 
" jj does not comprehend the uniqueness of future events as such. 
,I 
ljTemporal reality is no illusion of mortal mind. 2) Ignorance 
i jof the individual's completed idea constitutes determinism. 
I 
il Here Royce uses the concept of appreciation to point out the re-
lllatedness of the finite will to the etE.rnal will. 
1
1 
iii. Freedom and Appreciation. Perfect freedom is imp9s-
jj sible for a lesser being than the absolute,.... itself. Only.· in God 
II are lfnowledge and will one life. But the individual enters into 
II the fre-edom of that life in every act of choice (attentive sel-
l\ ection). 11 In choosinl:; for ourselves, we enter into and partake 
ij of the self who chooses this from the eternity of possible 
II . 
I· worlds • 113 In our perfection, the absolute is immediate fact 
~ which is "attained ••• £anQJ" by which we ••• ["have chose!}/ the pres-, 
ent world of fact from the infinite series of possible worlds, 
1. Wallace, LOH, 269. 2. Wallace, LOH, 264. 3. SMP, 436 •. 
I 
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[I which by virtue of this choice are no longer possible. 1 
'I 
In 
I, 
I! 
I' I ,, 
II 
.I 
11 
the words of Dr. Brightman: "When John Jones performs a free 
act, he is the absolute in action and ••• nothing else in the ab-
solute determines the nature of his act. 112 
Some understanding of the meaning of this attentive sel-
I 
1 action and of appreciation is observable to the individual in 
I 
II 
' I 
I 
1. 
il 
II 
I! 
his reflective moments. For instance, the finite mind is able 
to stand above the individual notes of a melody and view them 
in 11 one artistic moment." In this act of appreciation he tran-
scends time. The reflective life is a looking before and after 
in a single whole. We approve or disapprove, choose or deny 
the moments of an act in its wholeness •. The whole act contains; 
past and future, but contains them as parts of an appreciative 
whole or deeper reality. 11 In significance it is already in its' 
,I 
I 
1 measure a part of the eternal world estimate. 11 3 
ij 
II 
!I 
I! 
!I 
li 
J, 
'I li 
ji 
d II 
I 
I 
'I 
It is only as we actually enter into the process of will-
ing, that is, as we become more than speculative, that we are 
able to reach the essential character of the universe. Royce 
reaches into the depth of his system at this point. Individ-
uation is not a speculative concept. 
It is not the object as presented /brute fac~ nor 
the object of thought fa universal] but it is the 
1. The best of possible worlds 
i~ thus--meaningless before 
Royce's CQncept of an ac-
tual absolute who is ful-
filled in its own will. 
Bowne also in a similar 
I 
argument removes the cog-
ency of the idea of best 
of possible vmrlds. Bovme 11 POT, 265. . 
2~ Brightman, POR, 221. 
3. SMP, 432. 
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object as loved !attentively selected, the object 
of loyaltiTwhich is such that there can be no 
other opject .consciously recognized as a fit rep-
resen.tati9n of this type. 
liThe illustration which Rogers has given of individuation is the 
I' 
I' :' 
\1 exclusive love of the child for its toy above all other toys 
\!which are identical by description. The child has, in the. words . 
t! 
II 11 i ii of Royce, breathed the breath of new life into the otherw se 
,I ii dead and stubbornly universal cat~gories of merely abstract 
l\theory."2 In other words, objects of knowledge are individ-
1\uated because man is an ethical being. This is 4)qually predic-
11 
i\able of 
\ibeing. 
God. He knows objects as individuals as an ethical 
They are the objects of his ~ill or love. 3 
li 
\I 
lithe 
~~he 
Royce thus conceives universal teleology in the terms of 
individuating principle or love. The unity and purpose of 
individual life is instituted by the princip~e or individ-
His love for God constitutes his moral selfhood. On 
\I jp.ation~ 
II ~~he other hand, God's love ~or this unique world of unique in-
I 
~ividuals is his moral selfhood. The seemingly capricious proc-
il 
rsses or the. world become rational will when conceived· from the 
r,eternal perspective. This view is "its own judge and vindica-
,, 
i' \for. n4 
II ~~s of the nature of mind to conceive beyond actuality, God's com-
li ' 
tete.self-realization rests upon the "affection or coloring"--
No dissatisfaction is possible to the eternal. While it 
! 
1. COG, 263. 3. COG, 259. 
2. COG, 259. 4. SMP, 436. 
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il 
i· love. 
!I 
Love "involves a selection of some content as valuable 
:1 for reasons which can no longer be abstractly defined. ul This 
I, 
I' 1! content, this world,· ~s the "beloved object" or that object 
I! 
11! whose place could be 'filled by no other object. The attended 
·I 
I!  object, the beloved object is the irreducible element of the 
'I 
l1 divine perfection. 2 
l! 
II 
I! I' to approve it as the answer to critics of his questionable li 
Royce, by his constant restatement of this doctrine, seems 
li 
11 
11 block universe. 11 
I: 
li 
II 
'I li 
'I 
II 
6. Recapitulation. 
The world order as it is conceived by Royce is one coher-
I ent, whole, internally related being who is the perfection of 
I 
!I his finite individual parts, which are objects of his attentive 
I' 
t 
II 
!\ 
" it 
1l 
II 
:I 
~ I 
'I 
:I 
J, 
:i jl 
,I 
!I 
II 
il 
ji 
,j 
!! 
II 
II 
!! 
selection, and in turn obtain ethical freedom and responsibil-
ity by attentively selecting him. Temporal order, essential 
to the ethical character of finite individuals, is the content 
of the time-span of the Absolute. 
7. Evaluation and Criticism. 
i. Theism. Miss Calkins does not seem to concur with 
James as to the essential character of Christian theism. 
A Pluralistic Universe (1909) he states: 
The theistic conceptions picturing God and his 
creation as entities distinct from each other, 
In 
I' ~-1-. _C_O_G_,-2--1-5-.--
2. COG, 215. 
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still leaves the human subject outside the deep-
est reality of the universe •. God is from eternity 
complete, it says, and sufficient unto himself; he 
throws off the ·world by a free act and as an extra-
neous substance, and he throws off man as a third 
substance, extraneous to both the world an~ him-
self. That is the orthodox theistic view. 
The distinction between God and creature is toto genere. 2 And 
God is magistrate rather than associate. 3 
This view represents more accurately the Westminster Gate-
chism than does the absolutism of Royce, although Royce may be 
a theist of another type. 
ii. Unempirical Pantheism. Bo\~e contributes a signifi-
cant criticism of the non-empirical character of any theory 
which places the "world in God in any discriminable ontological 
form. 114 This not only cancels the "necessary unity of God," 5 
but all that we may experience is the causal relation of the 
world to an,intelligent agent. All speculative ideas which run· 
beyond experience make "shipwreck of reason." 6 
iii. Inscrutable Absolute. Rogers debates the proposition 
that an ideal consciousness as Royce seems to establish it is 
able to accomplish the high task to which it is set. 11 The self 
that gives intelligibility to knowledge is not my empirical self, 
James, PU, 25. 
James, PU, 26. 
James, PU, 27. 
Bowne, THE, 203. 
5. Bowne, THE, 203. 
6. Bowne, THE, 203. 
7. Rogers, EAP, 293. 
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The World Order il il II II The larger mind could compare the idea and its fulfilment while 
I! 
11 the finite individual "could not have the sense· of meaning at 
i! all. "1 James states the same problem in a different way. The 
II 
II perspectives of finite and infinite beings are respectively ex-
il 
:'! elusive since "we are invincibly parts, let us talk as we will, 
:i 
·, and must always apprehend the absolute as if it were a foreign li 
:l being. " 2 
I! 
II
! Rogers also questions the clarity of the horizontal rela-
" 'I 
·I 
11 tionships among men. This problem is directly related to the 
il 
II 
:1 one preceding. We not only lack windows to the absolute ful-
filment of our ideas, but we also lack windows to our fellow-
il II men. The objective medium of organized scientific knowledge 
,, 
!l (world of description) 11 presupposes already an acquaintance 
il 
" 3 :1 with other selves," but such lmowledge by acquaintance is 
II 
:1 "lacking in those categorized qualities that constitute the 
lj 
I' world of description. 114 On the other hand, the "world of appre-· 
I 
i ciation" does not lay my neighbor's mind "innnediately and tele-' 
; ~ 
tt 
Jl pathically open to my inspection. " 5 Only the inapproachable 
:i 
11 absolute enjoys such insight. Royce is cognizant of the prob-
d 
'I 
!/ lem throughout his works. His attempted answer seems to lie 
li 
;1 in his concept.ion of the innnanence of the Absolute, and in the 
~ idea of appreciation. II 
fJ His earlier theory of knowledge which looks in explicit I, 
ii social explanation does 
I' 1. Rogers, EAP, 293. 3. 
2. James, PU, 40. 4. 
=--~·- _:.=:.-;:=~.:::::-..:-.:::.~~==~::.:..:.::::::::-..:;;:::c.::-.:...,T--
not reveal the answer to Roger's crit., ! 
Rogers, EAP, 294. 5. Rogers, EAP, 296.j: 
Rogers, .EAP, 294. 
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!i icism as convincingly as does the later theory of inter,preta-
ii 
ij 
i\ tion. il 
I' 
The individual content and will are constituted by soci-
,I t il e Y• His recollection and intention are socially conditioned. 
1
11.\ 
A conununity is a mental p~enomenon embodying the larger whole 
ij 
li of the absolute ·mind. 
'I ,, 
True interpretations reach the truth of 
li the absolute mind. 
II 
And pppreciation, as far as the knowledge 
" of inner reality is concerned, is better categorized than that 
:: 
!! of scientific investigation, since science deals only with phe-
il 
/1 nomena. 
ii 
\I 
:i 
!i 
I' d 
iv. Empiricism and Will. Rogers has a further objection 
i! to Royce 1 s abso1.utism. 
:I 
Empirically the only approach to the 
~ I i' doctrine of many wills oriented within a single will is the 
I! ,, 
" analogous phenomenon of the "union of various impulses in the II 
n 
II,· m iJ finite life. tThe analogy breaks down, however, since an im-
11 
j! pulse is only an impulse in a. self, and not an I. 111 The gen-
ii 
'I I, 
II 
!! 
!/ 
uine character of our will does not allow the inhibiting fac-
tors of other wills. Interests and impulses are of another 
ji character than wills. 
d 
11 
il 
The Absolute as a single will which in-
" n 
II 
!I 
II ]; 
!! 
'I 
eludes many wills each individually determined in part and in 
part determined by the whole is unempirica1. 2 
v. Epistemological Monism. 
Mediation is involved in all self-knowledge, as well as in 
ii II the knowledge of other persons and things. Royce has conclt·.-
lj . 
48 
~ 1. Rogers, EAP, 296. 2. Rogers, EAP, 297. 
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ii sively showed this to be the fact of all finite knowledge. 
·I li 
d Even the finite time-span is not knmm intuitively. Epistemo-
11 
I! 
logical monism therefore is a "highly speculative 11 account of 
' ' 
the epistemology of the Absolute. The mystic alone knows the 
union of thought and thing. Royce is an epistemological dual-
ist as far as the knowledge of finite beings is concerned. 1 
vi. The Pro"!?lem of Value. One of the most difficult prob-
lems in Royce's world order is concerned with value theory. 
Leighton's argument with absolute idealism concerning this prob-
lem revolves about several theses. 1) "Individuals and value 
1! and reality are identical."2 2) The conception of individual-
r· i! '% li ity and v-alue is derived "from the world of finite selves."'"' 3) 
., 
God must be conceived as the "ground of real individuality and 
4 
values" or the "conservator" of values. 
Royce seems to adhere to the principle that "values are 
:1 real only in and for selves th8.t feel them." 5 Leighton recog-
'1 
:1 nizes the essential problem in this to be the status of the in-
il 
i! 
dividual as part of the Absolute. The reality of the self, he 
asserts, is lost or "swallowed up" in the Absolute if any iden-
tification of finite and absolute being is sanctioned. "No real 
self is merely part of another self."6 If the Absolute includes 
il all individuals a..r1d their completed individuality, the Absolute 
!! lr 
!I is the 11 center of ·value. 11 11 Since all interests are to find ful-
li 
49 
II 1. Brightman, ITP (1925~, 89. 1. Leighton, Art.(l932), 149. 
ij' 2. Leighton, Art. (1932), 142. 5. Leighton, Art.(l932), 138. 
I 3. Leighton, Art. (1932), 147. 6. Leighton, Art.(l932), 145. 
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ilfilment in the ultimate Being, it is o'f little or no account 
i! 
!iwhat becomes of the persons in and for whom [as far as we kno!J 
~ ~ 
!!these interests come alive. nl l: I With his emph~sis on will Royce 
ilattempts to maintain adequate distinctness of selves within the 
l!absolute self to allov,r for the reality of individuals. As long, 
:I 
!:however, as absolute and finite are focii of a single being, the 
II 
!!frustration of value theory is seemingly una~oidable. 
" I 
!; Leighton agrees with Bradley thc.t "the Absolute cannot be 
!!absolute and a self. 112 
,, 
:; 
On the other hand, the supreme reality 
'lmust be conceived by idealism as possessing selfhood if "indiv-
·' 
lJiduality and values are conceived in the cosmic process ." 3 Any-
IJthing less than this is u intellectual and axiological confu-
" ilsion."4 He concludes that since an Absolute is incapable of the 
l'task required of it by the universe, a personal God in a cosmic 
1 pluralism is in order. "Royce tried to hold the balance evenly 
i, 
llbetween a pluralism, for which the individual is the center of 
Jl 5 ilvalue, and the Absolute as All-Inclusive Unity." The direction 
liof his thought Leighton believed to be toward pluralism. Al-
ii 
llthough immanence is stressed in The Problem of Christianity, the 
l1basic structure of Royce 1 s li.Dsolute idealism does not seem to be ' 
il ~·lost. 
1! vii. The Problem of Determinism. Dr. Brightman vvrites of 
lithe notion of a "completed infinity of time" as that which is il----
111. Leighton, Art.(l932), 141. 
1.2. Leighton, Art.(l932), 118. 
J
13. Leighton, Art. (1932), 149. 
4. Leighton, Art.(l932), 150. 
5. Leighton, Art. (193_2), 134. 
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difficult to the free choice of man; it renders 
the actual ongoing of the time process far more 
subordinate in the Absolute than it seems to be 
in the real world; and it assigns to change and 
novelty a less ~ltimate significance than expe-
rience re~uires. 
The whole criticism by James of idealism as a block universe 
!i centers in the conception of the 11 beatific vision" of the eter-
'1 
'I 
l1 nal now. Royce 1 s attempt to avoid the lJroblem by making in-!, 
dividuality a moral category with uniqueness of finite individ-
uals contingent even for the Absolute upon the temporal order 
;I is more satisfactory than appears at first view. 'The Absolute 
q 
h 
!I 
li 
'I II 
I, 
/i il 
iJ 
il 
seems to be in time as the conscious whole of finite conscious-
nesses. The past for it is, as such, as irrevocable as it is 
to its parts; and the future, except in its abstract character-
istics, is as novel. The fulcrum of the eternal now and of its 
II !i perspective is, it would appear, the now of all conscious real-
li 
II i ty. Vvard, with respect to this, asserts that Royce "is guilty 
II 2 
jl of vacillation between God and the Absolute." "The Absolute 
li 
i! must be in every respect inclusive, but God, if his creatures 
are free, is so far not all-inclusive. 113 
1. Brightman, FOG, 133. 2. Ward, ROE, 313. 3. Vward, ROE, 313. 
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Chapter III 
MORAL GOOD AND EVIL 
1. The Nature of the Good. 
i. Goodness in Experience. An elementary definition of 
, the experience of good given by Royce is as follows: "Something 
that, when it comes or is expected, we actively welcome, try to 
attain or keep, and regard with content."1 Our experience of 
evil is "whatever we find in any sense repugnanj or intoler• 
r 
2 
able." But the experience of man is complex. He can at the 
same moment "shun one object and grasp at another." 3 The ten-
il sion may be the internal conflict of an individual in which the 
il 
II 
•I 
II 
q 
!I il 
!j 
II l: 
:I 
I 
il 
n ,. 
<I 
!I 
!! 
H 
good and evil impulses parallel each ot~er. Royce compares 
this fact to the parallel physiological fact "of opposing sets 
of muscles [whicl.!7 ••• hinder each other's freedom. 114 "Complex 
conduct" depends upon such tensions, and "this organization of 
life by virtue of tension of manifold impulses and interests 
••• must be a type of the organization of every rational life. 115 
The harmony of spiritual life is by way of the overcoming of 
elemental impulses 11 for the sake ·or the higher unity of life." 6 
\! And those who come nearest to the complete life of God have 
II ~ li triumphed over evil. The moral hero is one who has met seem-
.1 
:i 
a ii 1. SGE, 18~ 3. SGE, 19~ 5. SGE, 22~ 
il 
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11 2. SGE, 18. 4. SGE, 21. 6. SGE, 23. 
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ingly insuperable evil enemies and conquered them. Thus evil 
has found a subordinate place in his good life, although it has 
an essential place. Royce finds no warrant in experience for 
the dissociation of evil and good. They are always related 
factors. 
The good of experience, therefore, is not innocence, but 
requires an intimate knowledge of evil. 
ii. Moral Goodness Not Innocence. The innocent have no 
---·"- --·-~-
conscious experience of either goodness or badness. They are 
morally neutral, or without conscience. The element of temp-
tation in experience is the requisireof all moral or immoral 
action. The tempted man has an intimate knowledge of evil e~en 
while he is overcoming temptation. moyce explains this by way 
of his doctrine of will, or attention. An idea such as the 
idea of embezzlement, when it arises in the mind 11 already in-
volves a nascent deed,"l which if attended "turns into its ap-
propriate completed deed. 112 For instance, the idea of embez-
zlement which is already "possessed of its ominous internal 
meaning" if it persists in the field of attention, which is ''the 
only field of choice,"J must become the act of embezzlement. 
The 11 higher insight" or ought stands opposed as long as the 
field of attention. allows it place. The man who knows is one 
~ who has attende~ a thought or action until it has at least par-
tially become his own. For instance; the person who is \empted 
WI, II, 354. 3. WI, II, 355. 
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! by a "pernicious dainty!' while selecting a "wholesome food" is 
I, 
,, 
I' involved in positive knowiledge of the nature of pernicious 
d 
ii 1 il dainties • 
li 
Moral choice always involves rejection as well as 
' 
I! selection. Both actions require knowledge. "The consciousness 
of every moment of moral choice involves, also, a consciousness 
--a confession, if you will--or the presence in the chooser of 
i: 
il that which he regards as evil. 112 The evil motive is thus the 
il 
li possession of the moral man. Royce states: "Had he [the moral 
I• 
ji mao/ not first known that evil motive, and lmown it as his very 
!) 
he certainly could not have ••• chosen against it."3 Royce 
•, ,, 
It own, 
i• 
L !: describes the conceived 
I 
temptation to conquer Asia as exempli-
il 
)I fled by the German schoolmaster in Hegel's writings as virtue 
in potentiar, while Alexander's temptation was in actu. Only 
the experience of the actual moment of mastering temptation can 
!t decide the virtue of the act of choosing the good. 
i 
The good is always the experiential. It is the victory 
in.the conscious experience of an individual of the good motive 
over the evil impulse. The knowledge of one is as essential as l1 
the lmowledge of the other that the choice may be an intelligentll 
! 
il act of will. 4 
!I 
iii. Constant Victory a Destroyer of Temptation. An evil 
,, 
1; motive, when overcome by a good, is transmuted into a new fac-
il 
!1 tor, a moral act. The greater the knowledge of the evil, the 
:: 
i: 1. SGE, 99. 
I; 2. SGE ' 99 ~ 
ii 3. SGE, 99. 
1! 4. The predication of goodness 
i! 
to the Absolute is meaning-
tal only if the same condi- ! 
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:: greater the temptation, and the more moral the deed. The evil 
/i 
! 
,. motive dies in the new moral life. The principle of La vie 
c'est la mort is operative here as in all areas of existence. 
Royce shows the universal character of this principle in the 
areas of the known biology of his day.l But this principle is 
especially evident in conscious life. "Consciousness, like 
living tissue, loves to feed on its own process of endless self-li 
,I 
;f 
extinction. n 2 For instance, in the learning of a new language, ii :; 
syntax is the most prevalent element of experience. Gradually, 
,, 
i! however, as the language is learned syntax is forgotten and the ,! 
il ,. 
completed product, "unreflective fluency" and "organic power;' 
has emerged. 
In the ethical life of the individual a similar process is 
evident. The extinction of the conscious experience of moral 
victory becomes, though repetitious, habitual activity. The 
"deficiency" is transcended. Habitual moral action is not the 
extinction of morality, however. It is the way of perfection. 
Royce states: 
Vfuen I have so well learned this virtue as no long-
er consciously to possess it, but to be possessed 
by it as a mere instinct, well, then, indeed my 
active moral goodness will indeed cease as to this 
matter; but, on the other hand, I shall consciously 
be able to possess far more complex, active vir-
tues, than ever.3 
iv. Meister Eckh~~t, an Example of Moral Struggle. 
;j 
M t . ,, ys J.- i 
i ll ,, 
I, 1. SGE' 8 9' ff. 
ii 2. SGE, 109; cf. POC, I, 
+--
122, ff. 
3. SGE, 111. i' 
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cism, in general, exemplifies abstract morality. Virtue is the 
absence of evil. The moral man is the cloistered man, or one 
who has separated himself from the place of struggle. Meister 
!! Eckhart, however, is a mystic who was convinced that goodness 
!\ 
is not by way of the cloister. The attainment of the "wilder-
n i' ness of Godhead" is not by way of negation in sentiment and 
'I I· 
;
1 thought, but in action, and life. Meister Eckhart 
:I 
remembers that you cannot come into union with God 
until after you have learned to put off the creature, 
the world ••• You must, by the power of God, have over-
come iti and overcoming is a matter of many years of 
growth. 
The tension of life is central. The truth of sorrow is the 
1: peace of home to which it directs one. "There must be an ab-
solute union of spirituality and of daily activity." 2 Such ac-
tivity is the enemy of quietism. 3 Temptations and sorrows of 
the "outer man," when paralleled with the peace of the "inner 
man," are the essence of the moral life. 4· Moral goodness is 
conceived by Meister Eckhart in te~s of dialectic. 
v. Romanticism, a Pessimistic Foundation. Romanticism, 
with its mystical transcendence, which looks beyond tension for 
I, 
'i the solution of life 1 s 
'i 
)! as Royce is concerned. 
li 
problems, is veritable pessimism, as far 
The emp~rical is not the real, i.e. the 
i: 11 cloying 
1: q 
and hateful experiences'' of life must be purged away 
li 1. SGE, 288. 
l' 2. SGE, 292. 
3. SGE, 294~ 
4. SGE, 294. 
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H 
:: so that the transcendent good may be seen. The 11 coarseness of 
:, the real world" must be disguised, denied or ignored, "for the 
realm of divine truth is ~as it always was for TennysoEJ ••• a 
deeamland, to be reached through mystical exaltation. 11 1 God is 
!i 
:r the inscrutable being who stands beyond finite experience, but 
i who shows himself "on rare and romantic occasions to the de-
vout. 112 
Royce opposes all such views which negledt the reality of 
': the experience of individuals. The highest good which may be 
experienced is that of victory in the tensions of good and evil 
!! in life. Whatever good there is must be, as far as experience 
., 
ji is concerned, the good of the victor over evil. 
:: 
This is Royce 1 s:: 
i! 
In the next section, some of Royce's definitions and ex-
amples of moral evil will be examined. 
2.· Moral Evil in Royce's Writings. 
i. The 1Norld and the Individual. Mor~l evil is defined in 
SGE, 78. 
SGE, 79. 
morality, whether it be 
the morality of God or 
This, according to Royce, 
is the requisite of all 
man. Cf. "God and Suf- 'l 
ering," Chapter V. ll 
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-i 
i' The World and the Individual as the "conscious intent, as an 
I! act of choosing to narrow attention so as to ignore what ought 
to be known, and then to act in a~cordance with this vicious 
i ignorance. 111 Sin is, therefore, the act of an individual who 
:: 
!! 
' 
bas some apprehension of the right but who freely wills to deny 
the right. In so far as the object of attention is his own com-
plete and completely free self, sin is rebellion against one's 
better self. 
ii. The Philosophy of Loyalty.2 In Royce's primary work 
in ethics, The Philosophy of Loyalty, moral evil is related in 
a more definite way to society. Loyalty is the cause of a 
society of persons. Sin is any disuniting or disintegrating 
factor within society. The individual wins self-realization 
in society. "My own fuller life remains unuttered, and yours 
also, unless we find it each in the other and in the all. 113 
Loyalty, therefore, to the principle of loyalty prohibits all 
"unnecessary personal aggression upon what we commonly call the 
rights of other individuals" because in such action the rights 
of personal expression of loyalty are infringed. "Murder, ••• 
lying, ••• evil speaking, ••• unkindness" are forms of disloyalty.4 
Royce recognized that the unquestionable loyalty which 
~i motivated a robber in the robber band, or the loyalty of a pi-
: [i _______ _ 
H ill. 
: 2. 
VVI, II, 366. evil in the work will 
An outline of the philosophy be examined. 
of loyalty was given in the 3. Tsanoff, MIG, 562. 
previous chapter. In this 4. POL, 205. J 
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rate to his ship were good as loyalties, but that the causes of i' 
loyalty were unworthy.1 "Loyalty is a good for the loyal man, 
" but it may be mischievous for those whom his cause assails."2 
And when loyalty is endangered by an enemy cause, the supreme 
possession of life is endangered. The supreme evil, therefore, 
according to Royce, is the "mutually destructive conflict of 
loyalties."3 The most exacting definition of moral evil is 
that which is self-destructive or destructive to its own pr&n-
ciple of loyalty, or again, rebellion against the true characte~ 
of one's better self as it is revealed by society. 
In political relations, the great evil is the "self-es-
tranged spirit, 11 as it was called by Hegel. The individual 
loses the loyal ties which should naturally unite him to his 
state or nation. This may be caused by ignorance of relations 
other than the unnatural relations of authority and power. 
,. 
Thus, he obeys the injunctions of the state only because of the · 
protection offered, or for fear of authority. Royce conceives i: 
the answer to this moral problem to be education in provincial-
iam, i.e. 
the sort of provincialism which makes people want 
to idealize, to adorn, to ennoble, to educate their 
ovm province; to hold its traditions, honor its 
worthy dead and to multiply its public possessions. 4 
The character of the part will not thus be lost in the charac-
1. POL, 109. 3. POL, 116. 
2. POL, 111. 4. POL, 247. 
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terless whole. This enemy of good was exemplified, Royce be-
lieved, in the unnatural centralization of French life and 
thought in Paris. 1 The rich traditions of the provinces were 
lost2 and the self-estranged spirit, the provincial, was not 
motivated by his own principle of life. In the Philosophy of 
Loyalty, as in the earlier work, Royce has based his definition! 
of moral evil upon his interpretation of the world society as 
the embodiment of the individual. 
iii. The Problem of Christianity. In the Problem of Christ--
ianity, Royce uses the traitor as an illustration of moral evil.: 
He is depicted as the individual who has "won vast ideals, and 
a will that is now inspired to serve them," but who has become 
false to his own will, the chief value of his life. The loyal 
man becomes a traitor when he "lives with a will of his ovm ••• 
by a wilful closing of his eyes to the light."3 
The basic idea of society as the embodiment of the indiv-
idual is also the basis for the recognition of sin as self-de-
stroying and, as he calls it in this work, "unpardonable." The 
h 
o! 
individual himself cannot pardon {atone for) his ovm sin. Rec- .: 
tification, forgiveness, must be the work of society. 
Three important principles are evident in Royce's doctrine i! 
of sin as it is portrayed in these works. 1) Society is the 
f' definition and revealer oft he meaning of the individual good. 
2) The individual must wilfully approve and pursue the social 
; 1. POL, 247. 
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H 2. Aronson, PMJ, 172. 3. POC, I, 252. fi 
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Moral Good and Evil 
ideals which are given. No bifurcation of individual and soci-
ety is possible. 3) Sin is the estrangement of an individual 
from his chosen ideal, or the selection of a motive outside of 
his ideal. The good is-the condition of evil. Even as the 
; -
good is not a possible realization except as it is the fulfi~ 
ment of a struggle involving good and evil motives, so evil is 
an abstraction except in so far as it. is the negation of the godd 
whole. The metaphysics of the community is involved in both 
concepts. 
3. The Goodness of God. 
The absolute self includes both good and bad wills of fi~ 
nite individuals. The· problem is this: 11 V.ihether either good-
ness or badness, or both goodness and badness, or neither, 
should be predicated of the absolute self. 11 1 Royce's answer 
:· begins with the recognition that tension is the essential char-, 
acteristic of spirit. It is "the type of the organization of 
every rational life."2 Even as men are moral by way of the 
tension of good and evil, in which struggle the evil as an ob-
ject of knowledge is sublated in the higher unity of victory, 
so God is good because he knows evil, condemns it, and becomes 
victor over it. "The existence of evil, then, is not only con-
sistent with the perfection of the universe, but is necessary 
to the very existence of that perfection. 113 In answer to the 
query, Wby must we conceive the absolute as victorious in the 
., 
61 
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presence of devastating evils he contains, the absolutist 
1 
states: 11 Moral badness is the function of partialness, 11 and 
cannot be predicated of that which is by definition the whole. 
Perhaps, however, one of the m~ t serious problems of Royce's 
proposed moral order is evidenced here. 
4. Evaluation and Criticism. 
Modern thought has rebelled against the medieval concept 
of sheltered morality. The doctrine of morality which Royce 
adapts to absolute idealism has been used by many thinkers. The1 
limit of the concept as a complete answer to evil is recognized 
by Royce. Not all men are victors over evil. Natural evils 
are a problem to finite reason. Some difficulty also is en-
,, countered when the good and evil as it is known in the world is 
acknowledged to be of the being of God. 
In conj'Lmction viith this problem, James shows how man· . 
is involved in a "Dilemrn.a of Determinlsn, n (publj_shed in the 
Unitari~ Review, September, 1884, reprinted in Essa~s on Faith 
and Morals,) with the concept of a timeless God. In the pres-
ence of a heinous crime, the moral consciousness of man de-
clares an injustice, while the universe declares justice as a 
larger whole. For, the finite being it ought not to be, "some-
thing else ought to be 'in its stead. 112 The absolute requires 
that this fact could not be replaced by another; it is an essen-+: 
!\ tial ingredien~ of a perfect whole. 
i 
J 
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The right horn of the dilemma is pessimism. Schopenhauer 
symbolizes this interpretation. "The murder is a symptom ••• it 
is a vicious symptom because it belongs to a vicious whole whic~i 
i• 
:: can express its nature no otherwise than by bringing forth just 
such a symptom at that particular spot."1 
The left horn of the dilemma James calls subjectivism or 
gnosticism. To escape from pessimism the determinist must "a-
bandon the judgment of regret."2 This is accomplished by view-
ing the world as a being interested in the "deepening of the 
theoretic consciousness of what good and evil in their intrin-
sic natures are. Not the doing of good or of evil is what 
nature cares for, but the knowing of them." 3 Particular empir-
ical facts require interpret~tion by the universal view tiefore 
they may be judged good or bad. "Not the absence of vice, but 
vice there, and virtue holding her by the throat, seems the 
ideal human state."4 In this way, the evil facts are "white-
washed" and the universe "disinfected" according to James. 
Distinction between the good and evil of finite life are ex-
tinguished and the moral goodness c£.. ·t.'le whole is untarnished. 
Royce evide~~es the struggle with the argument of James 
' 
in Studie::~ d£. Good and Evil (1898). He chooses neither pessim-ij 
ism nor subjectivism. His answer lies mainly in his denial 
that evil facts may be whitewashed either for man or God. An 
evil is an irrevocable fact of history even when it has been 
1. James, 
11 2. James, 
I, 
EFM, 162. 
EFM, 162. 
3. James, EFM, 165. 
4. James, EF1~, 167. 
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transmuted into moral fibre by a good will. Both God and man 
ought to regret evil facts, condemn them, and overcome them by 
moral action. 
The morft basic problem remains unanswered, however. Is 
the ~bsolute a good being who contains, as essential moments 
of his life, all of the crimes of the finite wbDxd which deny 
the moral nature of man? Is he worthy of man's worship (worth-
ship ••• Brightman). Such moral perfection as he may have is an 
inscrutable reality to man. The answer which seems to be most 
probable is the following: Moral goodness as an attribute pred-i! 
icable of the will. The ~bsolute is perfect in will and know~ 
ledge although imperfect in parts. This may mean that he, even 
as man, is struggling for perfection in his temporal life while 
he is pe~fec~ in his eternal_ life; i.e. perfection is not a 
perfect whole of perfect parts. Evil, however, is not a for-
' eign receptacle with which he eternally strives but an element 
•. of his own being.l 
1. This bears some faint likeness to the conception of the 
finite God of Brightman. 
i 
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Chapter IV 
NATURAL EVIL 
1. Classification of Evils. 
Royce classifies evils first as volitional or non-volition-il 
!i 
,: al, i.e. moral evil or the evils of nature. His second classi- i 
.I 
---·-----·- ---·- J. 
-------- ------- ----n 
II 
,I 
fication is based upon value. According to this classification 
evils are either instrumental goods or apparent dysteleological 
1 
surds. In the ultimate analysis, however, all evils are in-
., 
strumental good, although finite minds are unable to comprehend !I 
the inner meaning of much of the evil in the world. For in-
stance, Royce notes that 
the very existence of the religious need ••• presup-
poses not only the presence, but the usual preval-
ence of very great evils in human life. For unless 
man is in great danger of missing the pearl of 
great price, he stands in no need of a saving pro-
cess.2 
i. Evils Hecognized as Instrumental Goods. Royce, in the 
Sources of Religious Insight, divides the evils which are the 
occasions of religious insight from the evils which are intol-
erable, seem to serve no purpose, and "ought to be put out of 
1. 11 A surd in mathematics is 
a quantity not expressible 
in rational numbers; so a 
surd in the realm of value 
experience is an evil that 
is not expressible in terms 
of Good, no matter what cp-
erations are performed on 
it. 11 Brightman, POR, 248. 
2. SRI, 224. 
Natural Evil 
existence. 111 Evils, whether moral or of the natural order 
which are a rebuke to the indifference of men,are the occasions 
, of moral development. They disturb the complacent optimj st by 
pointing out the dissatisfaction of the finite and the perfec-
tion of the whole. 
In this chapter, the basic problem of evil, which in Royce's! 
philosophy lies in the area of apparent dysteleological surds, 
will be discussed. 
ii. Apparent Dysteleological Surds. There are other evils 
which "ought simply to be put out of existence. , .. 2 The purely 
1 negative approach is occasioned by a "vast range of natural 
"11 n3 J. s. Beginning with death, which is the "classic example" 
4 
of natural evil, Royce lists many comparable ills. Physical 
' pain which is "plainly intolerable, 115 
pestilence, famine, the cruelties of oppression, 
the wrecks of innocent human lives by cruel for-
tunes ••• hereditary d1sease ["and the] fatal and 
unearned baseness ithat accompanies it~ ••• the 
hopeless and helpless degradation of the sinner's 
passive victim, ••• the mechanical accidents of 
nature, ••• brute chance,6 
and many other evils are listed aa not justifiable or compre-
hensible to human reason. "From our finite point of view there 
,i is no remotely dis cover able justification for this caprice. n7 
' 1. 
i, 2 j; • 
il 3. 
!14 l: • 
SRI, 232. 
SRI, 852. 
SRI, 232. 
WI, II, 362. 
5~ SRI, 232. 
6~ SMP, 468; 469. 
7. SMP, 470. 
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Royce classi'fiesl all evils which are not 11 sources of religious 
insight" within this category. They may be turned into instru-
2 
mental goods by the moral or religious man, but often "they 
seem to our natural understanding simply opaque data of experi-
ence to be annulled or removed if we can. 113 
The instrumental value of moral evil may be ascertained 
only in so far as it may be the object of the appreciative abil-
ity of man. The facility with which the inner meaning of the 
life of society is communicable to its members is lacking in 
the natural order. Before it is possible to find the proper 
interpretation of seemingly dysteleological facts, it vlill be 
necessary to outline Royce's cosmology. 
2. Cosmology. 
Hartshorne defines cosmology as 
the attempt, combining metaphysics and scientific 
knowledge, to discern the large, comparatively 
universal features of nature as now constituted ••• 
. ·!As such it is} acience running more risk~ than 
Usual, or indulging in greater vagueness. 
The interpretation of nature is given in several of Royce's 
works: Chapters 9, 10, 11, 12 of Th~~ri~ of Jiodern Philo-
p -·-·-----
ii 
' 1. This classification of 
evils'does not seem to be 
""" derived from a well organ-
ized value scale. Since 2. 
there are no intrinsic dis- 3. 
~ values in this world, all 4. 
"~~"~ ~" ~·"~:vils are classified ace-~ ." "~ 
, II 
I 
I 
cording to their reasonabl~ 
ness or apr:arent irrationa:'.··· 
characteristics. 
SRI, 233, 234. 
SRI, 233. 
Hartshorne, Art. ( 1950) 2 , 2 5. 
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sophy; Chapter 2 of Royce's Logical Essays. Perhaps the best 
organized account is found in The World and the Individual, Vol• 
!' 
ume II, Chapters 4 and 5. The fourth chapter1 is devoted to a 
criticism of the world views which bifurcate reality into the 
physical and mental, in which nature is conceived to he an ob-
jective lawful realm set over against mind or spirit. 
i. Relationsh~ of Individual and Society to Nature. He 
begins his criticism with a consideration of the psychological 
relationships of individuals and society with physical nature. 
2 
' Knowledge of the individual ego is initiated by the community. 
But as the individual becomes more conscious of self, he loses 
the immediacy of association with his fellows, and nature be-
comes the medium of union, or the n category of the between. 11 : 
'I 
d 
" Thus, the triadic order is established -- "my fellow and myself~· 
with nature in between us. n3 Nature seems relatively independ- '1 
; ent and verifiable; therefore, it is treated as an independent 
mechanical order which may be described by society. Associatio~ 
(! 
with other individuals is thus interpreted with some common 
ground of experience, and nature becomes the socially "suffi-
cient tool" of man. 5 It has no relations with man but is use-
i ful to man. 
The characteristic factor of nature is lawfulness. The 
~ course of its activity may be plotted by ascertaining the laws 
i 1. WI, II, 153-204. 3. WI, II, 177. 
!! 2. Cf. Ch. 2, Sec. 1. 4. WI, II, 178. 
:i 
--1!. 
5. WI, II, 181. :! 
!i ii 
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Natural Evil 
of nature. VJhatever does not conform to this recognized uni-
formity of nature is merely beyond our comprehension, but fu-
ture experimentation will reveal uniformity. Thus uniformity 
becomes a seemingly self-evident truth, while in truth it has 
not even been verified empirically -- its only authority for 
existence is the 11 emphasis that our social interests give to 
the discovery of uniform laws where we can discover them. 111 
! The social usefulness seems to require its axiomatical exist-
ence. Nature is adapted to man's existence. 2 
Royce destroys the naive assumption of the conformity of 
nature by comparing man's mastery of nature with his mastery in 
i' the arts. 11 Both succeed by selection from the mass of mate-
rials offered, by rearrangement of what is found, and by skill 
in adjustment."3 The simpler teleology of less enlightened 
periods of civilization which regarded nature as a storehouse 
of treasures suited for man's use is no less obsolete than that 
view which regards it a 11 treasure of purely mechanical laws --
as a thesaurus of concepts, of calculable relations, of rigid 
'! necessities, or as a realm of mechanical formulas. 114 
According to Royce, the truth is that we discover from 
empirical sciences "that our human internal meanings do indeed 
possess some reference to a vast finite realm beyond ourselves, 
WI, II, 195. 
Several of the essays 
in Royce's Logical Es-
says edited by Robin-
son deal with this problem. 
3. WI, II, 200. 
4. WI, II, 201. 
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within which we men find our place."1 We have little under-
standing of the actual character of nature itself from our 
" description of its lawful relations, however. "Vmat empirical 
science can try to tell you is not what things are in them-
selves, but how they behave. 112 No law of science, i.e. the 
law of gravitation, is an ideal formula which is ever "precise-
ly verified at any time." 3 The things falling and bodies mov-
ing are recorded in their relations and organized into statis-
tical formulas. Royce does not deny the value of such formulas, 
but he does question their ultimacy as interpretative of the 
essence of things. And when "we distinguish between the ideal 
constructions of scientific theory and the directly verifiable 
behavior of natural facts, we begin to see less contrast between 
matter and mind." 4 Royce is a scientific agnostic. 
ii. Conscious and Unconscious Nature. In the fifth chap-
ter5 Royce gives his "interpretation of nature." He begins by 
noting that what is considered to be unconscious nature and 
conscious nature share "four great and characteristic types of 
processes. 116 1) Both regions of the natural world have pro-
cesses which are irreversible. Historic facts are non-repeat-
able in their particularity in any part of the natural proce$ • 
Time rates in the flow of process are different. 2) Both re-
~ gions tend to communicate. Even as ideas tend to assimilate 
other ideas, so wave-movements are communicative in the realm 
:j 
Ill. WI, II, 202. 3. WI, II, 214. 5. WI, II, 205-243. 
i\ 2. WI, II, 214. 4. WI, II, 219. 6. WI, II, 219. 
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of physical nature. 3) Both realms, conscious nature and "un-
, conscious" nature, consist of processes which resemble the hab-
:· its in mental life. The rhythms of physical nature have no 
absolute stability, but seem to be patterns of the behavior of 
a period or age.l The relative constancy of the rhythms of 
H 
j nature pass into the irrevocable past change of the universe. 
il 
JI"The rhythm of the earth 1 s rotation on its axis, [for instanceJ 
!i or of the relatively stable movements of the planets is a gen-
:i f, 
'I 
~ i 
:1 
:J 
,, 
i! 
uine, but not an everlasting process of nature."2 4) The final 
processes which are apparently shared by both conscious and un-
conscious nature are those of the evolutionary processes them-
selves, i.e. "from inorganic to organic and finally to con-
scious nature."3 
Royce, working upon the hypothesis that these likenesses 
are significant as far as the inner reality of nature is con-
cerned, worked out his cosmology around two premises. 1) There, 
is no unconscious nature. Each part of nature is conscious or 
part of a larger conscious whole. 2) Portions of nature's 
processes differ in time-spans, and are thus beyond the apprec-
iable reach of the consciousness of man. 
1: iii. Natu~~'-- a Consciou_s Reality. The cosmology of Royce 
t! 
li has been characterized by Hartshorne4 as panpsychism. Royce 
:I 
~ J! does not hold, however, that every factor o~ reality is con-
71 
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scious reality but only that every part of reality is "part of 
a conscious process."1 Royce, like Whitehead and Hartshorne, 
recognizes 11 that there is a vast range of extra-human life, 
limited in its nature like the life of man." 2 11 Nature for us 
is real in precisely the sense in which our fellow-men are 
1 
real. n3 It is not reducible to God's consciousness in any oth-
er way than human conscious beings may be counted the conscious-
ness of God, nor is it merely human experiences and ideas with 
the providential direction of God as it was for Berkeley. 
This bears little relationship to the monadological pan-
psychism of whitehead and Hartshorne, however. It follows more 
closely the 11 synechological" theory of Fechner, i.e. larger or-
ganismic portions of nature are conscious. All nature is not 
necessarily conscious but elemental natural structures are con-
scious themselves or part of other larger organisms which are 
conscious. With this his relationship to Fechner is terminated, 
however, for v;hereas Fechner classes animals, plants, the mem-
bers of the solar system, etc. among the sentient factors of 
:the universe, Royce considers that even animals and plants may 
be only portions of larser rational persons. He writes: 
ii ---------
\\ 1. 
' 
'i 
,, 
WI, II, 233. For White-
head, the most elemental 
body of this kind is the 
"molecule, and a set of 
molecules :t;orms a lump of 
ordinary matter, such as 
a chair or a stone." 
Whitehead, SMvv, 155. 
2. WI, II, 236. 
3. VJI, II, 236. Royce does 
not seem to t~ke adequate 
account of the factors, emo-
tion and freedom at this 
point. 
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The psychical life which we ~efer to the lower 
animals is, according to my interpretation, mere-
ly a fragment and a hint of a larger rationality 
which gets its fuller individual expression in the 
evolution of a species, or genu~ or order, or other 
relative whole of animal existence.l 
Royce points out the distinction between this cosmological · 
theory and the "animism" or the "tendency by mere analogy to 
endow stones or planets with a quasi-human life."2 The theory 
of a conscious natural world, as it is conceived by Royce, is 
3 
rather based upon the fundamental premise of idealism itself. 
Nature as well as human reality must be a place for the "self-
conscious logos." It is of the character of mind. 
3. The Problem of the Interpretation of Nature. 
The problem of why we are not able to apprehend the natur-' 
al world as conscious reality is answered by Royce with an ap-
peal to the nature of consciousness. Each order is rendered 
distinct and relatively incomprehensible to the rest of reality_ 
by the peculiar character of its consciousness. 
"Our consciousness, for its special characters, is depend- 'i 
li 
. ~ 
ent upon a certain fact which we might well call our particular i; 
time-span." 4 If we are to be aware of a temporal factor in 
reality, it must be a possible experience to our form of con-
sciousness. Events which are either too rapid or too slow are 
not appreciated by the human consciousness. The time-span of 
--------------
WI, II, 241. 
WI, II, 427. 
3. SMP, 427. 
4. Wit IIrl 227, Ct. "The World 
Oraer, Chapter 2. ·==~= II 
41--il 
., 
some factors of reality, e.g. the solar system, is too inclusivei 
~ ; 
and prolonged to be observable in its changes to the human con-
sciousness. In other parts of reality the time-span is too 
brief, e.g. atomic life, to be appreciated by human conscious-
ness. Theue areas must remain relatively obscure, as far as 
an appreciation of their inner life is concerned. 
Royce compares animate nature to the face of a friend, 
from which we may obtain some suggestion of inner life, while 
inanimate nature composed of its complexity of ether waves is 
too remote for human appreciation. 
Every ••• interpretation of nature is fragmentary 
and hypothetical since we dwell not at the center 
of the truth of the logos but in our finite iso-
lation of half-conscious temporal insights. 1 
And although the way of appreciation is inadequate, "interpre-
tation in appreciative terms" is far superior to a "mere inter-
pretation' of phenomena. The truth of aature, as of man, lies 
in the world mind beyond space, time and aausality, or the 
world of scientific description. This is an idealistic uni-
verse, and the unity and integration of the whole is assured. 
"Man echoes in his passion experiences of good and of ill, the 
fortunes, the interests, and the ideals of vast realms of other. 
conscious and finite life."2 The depth of the echoing of in-
dividual experience is not only to be found within the world of 
other human beings but also within the whole life of more in-
1. SMP, 426. 2. WI, II, 384. 
il 
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comprehensible nature. 
Thus, for instance, fRoyce asserts,7 our organic 
pain and the more instinctive emotfons have a depth 
and a manifoldness hypothetically ••• expressing the 
will of the race rather th~ the individual, and of 
nature-life in its wholeness rather than the life 
of any man.l 
No explanation for each evil factor may be given in the 
conscious life of finite reality, but, according to Royce, 
"each element of the full life of the absolute finds its place 
!: as essential to its full and concrete meaning. "We have seldom 
any right to venture upon any detailed speculations 112 concern-
![ ing nature. "The wise man contents himself, as far as possible,;l 
with knowing in general. 113 Why pain, prolonged suffering and 
disease are present may not be answered in an inquiry into the 
'physical organism for each individual case, but only in an ap-
preciation of the inner meaning of reality, temp~ral and eter-
nal. 
4. Atonement. 
Both the evils of nature and the moral evil which is the 
~ : p 
fruit of the individual will form part of an organic whole from : 
which no part may be extricated. 
Morally evil deeds and the ill-fortune of mankind 
are ••• inseparably linked aspects of the temporal 
order. It is impossible to trace all of the de-
fects in the finite order to their causes, but, 
2. WI, II, 388. 3. WI, II, 388. .I 'I it 
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in so far as the world is a moral order, we suf-
fer together ••• [Not only are the consequences of 
sin shared by all, but in so far a~ nothing human 
is alien to me, then, however much my individual 
free will may be set against any direct consent to 
the evil doer's particular purpose, this my free 
will, by virtue of our very definition of individ-
uality, is in no sense absolutely independent of 
the common human nature which I share with the sin-
ner. All human sin.is, therefore, indeed, in some 
sense my own.l 
We may be ignorant of the internal meaning of nature's processes: 
and not understand the particular agency involved in the erup-
. tion of this volcano or in the hurricane which devastates the 
, area and destroys huinan life. In fact, 11 the diabolical elements!: 
in the finite world at large ~are no~ a profitable search for 
· us mortals. n2 However, we may be assured that we are organic-
ally related to all reality and, in perhaps an unknown way. to 
I 
finite understanding, we share in its evils. All finite realitY,' 
is characterized by dissatisfactions, but (and here is the im-
portant interpretation of Royce which makes stoicism and will 
to overcome intelligible) "were there no longing in time, there 
would be no peace in eternity. 113 Evil is the antithesis of the 
thesis, struggle, whose synthesis is meaningful moral life. 
Royce 1 s doctrine of atonement serves two purposes, therefore, in•, 
I 
. his Weltanschauung. 1) It is the way of self-realization, or 
perfection and 2) it is the way of the perfection of the whole. 
We have discussed the theory that the possibility of true 
!I 
il morality is the existence of ills which may be overcome. 
:1-- --
The 
:! 1. WI , I I , 38 9 • 
I 
2. WI, II, 388. 3. WI, II, 386. 
*=-
11 
.I 
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process of moral growth is also'the effecting of atonement. 
Evils, both moral and non-moral, are transmuted into moral good 
by the means of the struggle of individuals. The very evil 
which in its nature is "world destroying" beoomes a central 
t factor in the moral universe. 
Royce presents the concept of atonement in several of his 
1 
major works. The most complete presentation is probably given 
in the first volume of the Problem of Christianity. 
I! 
In that work, evil is associated with the doctrine of time~j 
Deeds committed in past time are irrevocable. They may not be 
removed, nor may the blight of them be removed, for they have 
been written into reality itself. The sinner himself cannot 
forgive himself, nor may he be forgiven by his neighbors. For-
giveness may only be effected in atonement. Mere lip confessioni 
cannot remove the effects of evil. 
But moral evil is also associated with community. Sin is 
not the deed of an isolated individual. Sin involves the com-
munity of which the traitor is a voluntary member. 2 In fact, 
there can be no treason apart from the Beloved Community. The 
"Beloved Community demands for itself such freely, delib.erately . 
steadfast members. And for that very reason, in a world where 
there is such free good faith, there can be treason."3 Sin is 
f"' against the love oftthe community, but the "community cannot 
1. WI, II, ch. 8, 9; SGE, 
ch. 1; SMP, ch. 8. 
2. POC, I, 294. 
3. POC, I, 299. 
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undo the traitor's deed.nl The .cQ.mmunity and the individual 
I 
: are bound by the irrevocable character of past deeds. · However, '' 
while the past temporal factor is beyond the power of men, the 
future lies open to his creative. activity. Reconciliation must 
be the transmutatio~ by the community of a sinful deed into a 
positive good. ·It must be the "triumph of the creative will. 112 
J 
The creative deed of recpnciliation so transforms the world, 
that it is better that the sin be atoned for than.that the evil 
i fact be undone. 3 Therefore, "great calami ties are, for all but 
the traitor himself, ~- so far as we have yet considered his 
case, -- great opportunities."~ 
Royce assures us that the activity of atonement is no mere 
stoicism, nor yet a "kindly' fo:r:giveness, 11 nor the colorless 
dream of the mystic. 5 The evil deed is neither tolerated, nor 
estimated in terms of passive forgiveness, nor overlooked. Theil 
:; 
atoning deed does not make evil less evil. It stands in histor,1:i 
as rebellion against the moral order. But, in the atonement, 
i the moral order of the world is righted. 
5. Recapitulation. 
1) There are, according to Royce, evils which are not 
transmuted into moral good. They appear to be dysteleological 
surds to the finite mind, but, because of the idealistic char-
acter of reality, they do find their place in the good whole. 
1. POC, I, 302. 
, 2. POC, I, 306. 
i! 
3 • POC , I, 301. 
4. POC, I, 306. 
5. POC, I, 308. 
ii 
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Many of the evils of nature are within this category. 
2) Royce is a scientific agnostic. Scientific method only 
tabulates the aspect of physi~al reality. The noumena or the 
inner aspect of reality is open only to appreciation. 
3)_Nat~re in all its phas~s both animate and inanimate is 
either conscious or part of a larger whole which is conscious. 
4) The inner life of nature is largely inscrutable to the 
consciousness of man because of the difference in time-spans of 
the conscious parts of reality. 
' fi 
5) Man, as an organic part of the larger whole of the hum~l 
~ i 
race and of the natural order in general, feels the cosmic pain :i 
li 
and disorder of the whole. He may not understand the specific ;! 
relations to the whole but, because of the general nature of 
reality, as a single conscious being he may be assured that ap-
parent dysteleological surds are explained by an appeal to God'~~ 
entire life as the fulfilment of his ovm life. 
6J Atonement is the immanent process of the correcting of 
: both moral and natural evils. 
6. Evaluation and Criticism. 
There are important problems involved in Royce's solution 
to the problem of natural evil. 
i. The ~imi t~_ oL~.EJ?.reciation. The absolute consciousness 
involves a harmonious satisfaction of all historic ills. li Atone-11 
~ ! 
'I 
. ment, the complete righting of all finite wars, is eternally ef- !, 
II 
l1 fected. 
II 
The individual is able to transcend the particular 
ti 
fY illl 
-- --=* 
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by identifying his partial self, which knows this evil in its 
incompleteness, with his true self which has overcome this evil. 
The finite individual, however, is unable, because of the real-
ity of the sundering of finite consciousnesses, to rise to an 
immediate apprehension of the true meaning of this evil. He not 
only does not understand the atonement on the level of human 
experience, but finds the realm of nature almost completely in-
comprehensible. The interpretation of this area may be known 
only in so far as he is able to interpret the content of his ex-
perience. Appreciation may be depth consciousness, but it is 
! not the becoming of the one, or absolute consciousness. It is 
the ability to unite the seemingly discrete elements of the ex-
;! ternal world into one reasonable whole, but no finite person 
attains the complete reason of the whole. 
ii. The P~oble~_?f Empiricism. An empiricist would go no 
farther than the evidence of experience warranted.l Dr. Bright-
man has observed, concerning the theistic absolutist: 
Because of his predilection for a few experiences, 
the theistic absolutist sweeps to one side great 
masses of empirical fact with the a priori faith 
that some day they will be explained. In this he 
is unempirical.2 
!r Royce gives due observance to the empirical fact of evil on 
:i 
:' i every 
:1 
level, but he does agree that the solution to the essen-
!1 tial problems of life lies within the area of appreciation 
1'1 1. But h~ would include all rience offers. 
i
1 
the evidence that expe- 2. Brightman, POR, 313. 
I 
II 
where 
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the individual is able to rise above both good and evil details 
! to the place of interpretation of the inner meaning of reality. 
. This is a claim to the omniscience of the absolute which is not 
!i warranted by empirical evidence. 
Bowne speaks of optimistic arguments, however, as never 
the source of our optimistic faith, but only -x•easons for a 
faith already possessed. 111 Faith in the ethical character of 
the universe is 11 beyond inductive logic, falthoug~ ••• not in-
dependent of induction. 112 Royce has an implicit trust in the 
goodness of reality which is based upon his arguments for ab-
solute idealism. The absolute self cannot, as a single being, 
be both good and bad, and "observation indicates that moral bad-
ness is a function of partialness." 3 The absolute cannot be 
conceived as less than complete, and therefore is a good being. 
i! 
iii. Cri tif:?_isl!l__Q.f_Panp~Q_ism. Hartshorne notes that the 
particular panpsychism of Royce has not been accepted by poster-'; 
ity. 4 It was adapted to his special problems. The entire 
theory, perhaps, might have been left out of the philosophical 
'Weltanschauung of Royce without apparent loss. The natural 
world might have been conceived to be, as it is ultimately, 
the consciousness of God. In so far as human consciousness can, 
not apprehend its inner nature as it is, except by way of the 
~ , general categories of reality, nothing seems to be gained by a 
detailed explanation. Nature is no less inscrutable when con-
1. Bowne, THE, 272. 
2. Bowne, THE, 273. 
3. Calkins, PPP, 430. 
4. Hartshorne, Art. (1950) 1 , 447. 
p 
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- ~---=c:~--c= =fl="'-=-~~c:: .. "'-,:'o;·-,,.,., =oc.-;.-~.c~ ··.-.-- ·•·· -==·:·c.-- .. -·-
! Natural Evil 
ceived as the consciousness of God. The darkness surrounding 
natural evil would be no less intense. 
·I 
iv. The Appea+ __ _!9. __ _1_@~r~. Dr. Brightman has criticizedj! 
the absolutist's pppeal to ignorance in this way: "Our ignor-
ance must lead either to silence or to further investigation. 111 !j 
i 
'i Royce appeals to our ignorance of the specific character of the !: 
evils of nature but he is assured that they are ultimately part i! 
of a good cause. He is not assured, however, that fubther in-
vestigation into the specific meaning of particular evils is 
profibable search. But he certainly is not silent concerning 
the interpretation of the whole of reality. 
The appeal of Royce to ignorance is in some respects like 
that of Bowne. The goodness of the world does not rest upon 
2 human interests. In fact, the universe "may have inscrutable 
ends which it perfectly realizes. 113 Bowne is far more optim-
:j 
'i 
1 is tic in his appraisal of the instrumental value of world evils~~ 
They both recognize the moral value. "Man as he is can be made i 
perfect only through struggle and suffering, 114 and the lack of 
perfection of the physical world 11 in itself is its perfection 
considered as an instrument for the up-building of me.n. 11 5 
Royce, however, is unable to see the responsibility for the un-
learned lessons of nature as entirely a product of "sloth and 
' ignorance" 6 of man. Thus Royce seems to take a more empirical 
. 1. Brightman, POR, 310. 
!; 2. Bowne, THE, 270. 
4. Bowne, THE, 278~ 
5. Bowne, THE, 276~ 
II 3. Bowne, THE, 278. 
=-c::~==·"'""''==--""'=-_-,-:";.-;.--,:== ·:.-:=:-= .. :--~~ -- .--....:=; .... 
6. Bowne, THE, 276. 
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account of the natureof evil, although he does not rest on his 
empirical knowledge for the interpretation of reality. With 
" 
both Bowne and Royce, the full solution will be given for the 
· finite mind "behind the veil."1 
1. Bowne, THE, 269. 
'I 
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GOD AND SUFFERING 
The most important insight of Royce concerning the solution 
to the problem of evil is that the absolute consciousness shares 
in the actual sufferings of finite beings. This fact is the 
1 guarantee that evil is not ultimate in the universe: for the 
absolute included the finite experience_of evil as its own, but 
as transcended in the goodness of his moral life.1 Evil, with-
out becoming in any way in itself a good, is the experience of 
both God and man. God, however, knows the victory over all 
evils in his own life. Finite life is organically a part of 
that life, and participates in that victory. Atonement may be 
considerea the immanen~ aspect of the solution of the problem 
of evil, while the i-dentity in suffering of God and man is the 
more transcendent,aspect of the solution. 
1. God's Experience. 
The premise upon which this doctrine is founded is the 
following: "Individual experience· is identically a part of 
God's experience, but identically-the same as suqh portion. 11 2 
~ 1. Hartshorne writes concern- sends us suffering, while 
~ , ing the value of a suffer- himself remaining simply 
ing God; "Those 'fhO think outside it, inthe enjoy-
God must mean well toward us ment of sheer bliss." 
because he sends us suffer- Hartshorne, DR, 31. 
il ing can prove their point · 2. COG, 292. 
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God and Suffering 
It will be necessary to exrumine the metaphysics of the ex-
;,perience of the absolute self. Miss Calkins prescribes as pre-
liminaby to this consideration that we must "remember that the 
!'term 'self' as applied to the absolute must mean qualitatively 
~ : 
· precisely what it means iil its application to human selves. nl 
it 
·I 
i' Difference must be in terms of its absoluteness as a self. The ·' 
principal, "attribute to the absolute self all experiences and 
characters of the finite self which are essentia 1 to selfhood b~: 
[flo ·not) attribute to it any qualities which are inconsistent with· 
'· absoluteness, 2 is essential to the procedure of Royce as well 
as to that _?f Miss ~alkin~. She has found four "forms of con-
sciousness" which conform to the principle: '!1..) Perceiving and 
imagining, 2) thinking, 3) feeling (emotion), 4) affirming 
i. (willing and believing) ••• fThese four are supplemented b¥} mora11: 
quality (goodness and badness)."3 Royce treats these 11 forms of 
consciousness" as relations of selves4 and according to Miss 
Calkins, unnecessarily limits the "conception of individuality 
' to will and purpose to the neglect of other relations. 11 5 But 
while Royce does emphasize the will as the principle of indiv-
iduation he does not neglect other relations. 
Consideration in this section will be given to these rela-
tions especially when they are of importance to the immediate 
~ 'problem of the chapter, i.e. God's Suffering. 
i 
..... j: 
'' 1. Calkins, PPP, t22. 
2. Calkins, PPP, 422~ 
1: 3. Calkins, PPP, 423. · 
====*--·"'·-==c=.·co.=c•·•·c-• cc oc=cc··.c_·c 
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4. Calkins, ~PP, 435. 
5. Calkins, PPP, 438. 
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i. Sensational Consciousness. The absolute is conscious 
of the immediate data of sensation as they are perceived by the 
finite mind. His experience is far 11richer than our fragments 
of scattered senaation, 11 1 however. Sensations are never exper-
i 
ienced by individuals without interpretation: "value, relations,;; 
the whole significance are involved in what experienced facts 
I 
might come to us through the senses. 11 2 Therefore, since God 
experiences the very sensations which are the experience of 
finite individuals, he experiences them in the context of finite: 
perspectives as well as in his own complete perspective. He 
must experience the nauseating gas as it claims its victim in 
all of its horror, while he experiences the larger good of this 
evil overcome. 
ii. Absolute Thought. The first essential attribute which, 
q 
Royce gave to the Absolute was thought. The Absolute is a 
thinking being. In the Conception of God Royce relates thought 
to experience in the Absolute. 
The Absolute is an omniscient being for he has"an all em-
bracing, direct and transparent insight into hix own truth. 113 
,, The 'tactors ••• in completed· and genuine knowing, 11 according to 
this essay, are "fact or something experienced ••• and mere idea 
or pure thought about possible experience. 114 In the finite 
being these two factors are divorced. Finite ideas seek their 
1. COG, 8. 3. COG, 8. 
2. COG, 11. 4. COG, 10. 
:I 
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I 
' true interpretation and meaning in future experience. Their 
r, primary characteristic is restlessness. In the absolute being 
the two factors,.idea and full experience or fact, are "distin-
guishable 11 but not separable factors. The Absolute is omnis-
( 
cient, which is defined: "The complete and final fulfilment of 
idea in experiencf§,the unity of thought and fact."l Finite 
thoughts are known in their partialness by God, but also as they~ 
are embodied in complete truth. 
iii. Feeling. The most important experience of the Abso-
lute to the problem of this thesis is the experience of feeling : 
or emotion. God, as omniscient, comprehends in his "perfect 
fulness what we call feeling -- a world of immediate data of 
cons-ciousness, presented as facts. " 2 Miss Calkins has compared 
the experience of feeling with the sensation of color. Know-
ledge of color cannot be in any way abstract. To know color is 
to have a specific sense experience of it. It may not be ex-
plained intelligibly to the genetically blind. Feeling of spe~ 
cific sorrow or suffering cannot be the second~ry experience of ;, 
, interpretation. God must experience this feeling in all of its 
contingency to the finite experiencer if we attribute knowledge :! 
of finite feeling to him at all. God must feel human feelings 
or experience the quality of evil. Royce does not seem to take 
suffiqient account of what is involved in the feeling of finite :: 
beings. Will and morality witA respect to the Absolute have 
1. COG, 12. 2. COG, 11. 
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1 
already been considered. 
2. Identification in Suffering. 
i 
· It is possible to comprehend more perfectly the most essen~: 
. d 
·: 
, tial aspect of Royce 1 s answer to the problem of evil with this 
analysis of the experience of the Absolute. 
' stitutes part of the life of the Absolute. 
The individual con~~ 
"He is the very sou~ 
,, 
of your so~l ••• when you suffer, your sufferings are God's suf-
ferings, not his external work, nor his external penalty, not ·! 
:i 
the fruit of his neglect, but identically his own personal woei~ 
As he is identified with the finite sufferer so also is he iden~ 
tified in the desire to overcome. 
To explain the significance of this fact of identification 
i in suffering and moral struggle Royce shows the necessary place 
of suffering in the absolute life. "It is a logically neces-
sary and eternal constituent of the divine life."3 The captain'; 
'I 
FerrJ has :i of salvation must be perfected through suffering. 
argued that God 1 s "suffering is essential to our understanding 
of his love. 114 The concept of savior involves identity in auf-! 
:i 
f_'ering with the saved, but he recognizes a problem which is in- :1 
r: q 
volved in suffering deity. Can suffering be "an aspect of eter~ 
ni ty" as well as t'ime? Is not Christ, the mediator, too closely,j 
1: 
identified with "God when the Father is said to suffer? Ferrfl i! 
1. Oh. 2, 11 The World Order; 11 3. SGE, 14. 
Oh. 3, "Moral Good and Evil. 11 4. FerrEf, ECE, 134. 
2. SGE, 14. 
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counts the divine life already perrect as eternal. But unless 
Jesus Christ is identified wi,th both deity and man in sufferm g,! 
he is no proper savior, according to Royce. 
The passivity of suffering is not present in the divine 
.-J 
life. This is one difference between finite and infinite re-
lations. The Absolute suffers because it wills this type of 
1 life which is perfected by suffering. 
Thus, the true solution of the problem of evil, according 
to Royce lies in the knowledge that in the very presence ot 
devastating evil all is well with the world. Such knowledge is :, 
' 
not the persuasion of the usual optimist, however. The abstractl,i 
element involved in dualistic epistemology is not entertained 
here. The Absolute knows sin in all of its pettiness, but it 
knows it as overcome completely in the moral victory of its 
life. The individual is not only part of that victory but 9.1so ,; 
in every act of knowledge acknowledges that victory in the as-
surance that his finite incomplete ideas are completed in the 
I 
1: Absolute. 
~oyce has tied his entire system into one closed circle. 
All of the parts fit together in such fashion that no part may 
be left out of the proper interpretation. 
The transcendent element of reality, the absolute self-con~l 
I 
sciousness cannot be isolated from the immanent aspect, the be- :j 
'i 
loved community where all sin is atoned for and the less com-
-=.:.:. .. :.::. _ _:_ :_::==------~::...:..:: . ..:...--=::::=:...::: 
prehensible natural world where the depth of human and divine 
experience is realized. Royce's answer to the problem of evil 
may be viewed from several perspectives, but its strangth lies 
in the coherence of his absolute idealism itself. The basic ,! 
criticisms of the solution lie therefore in the larger crit-
icism of the system as a whole. 
3. Problems in the Concept of Suffering. 
Hocking counts Boyce's solution to the problem of evil to 
1 be one of the 11 modern forms of stoical doctrine." Stoical 
doctrines "assure us that welfare lies in the pursuit, not in 
the winning. 112 The principle of "altruism, or vicarious hap-
piness" may take this form: 
Success there must be, but it need not be my suc-
cess; mastery of fortune there must be, but it need 
not be my mastery. Let me but know or believe in 
some power that is controlling or shall control 
physical events.and history; then the event begins 
to have a meaning, and I can find my happiness in 
the assured victory of that power, though free as 
any stoic from the need of victory in my own per-
son.3 
In the act of knowledge the individual participates in the vic-
tory of the absolute consciousness. 
Hocking recognizes the concept of vicariousness to be 
wholly necessary. But it has no ability to heal the "fatal 
separation from one's own immediate concerns {or} it might be 
regarded as sufficient."4 The problem of the immediate mis-
3. Hocking, MGH, 496. 
4. Hocking, MGH, 500. 
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fortune of this present moment is pushed into another realm 
rather than solved. The sh~ck of the particular evil is dis-
tributed "through the whole'range of my vicarious interests. 111 
But the consolation of such distribution is not the reassurance 
that my'action is of value. It is a passive rather than a pos-
itive attitude toward evil. 11 Not resignation but renunciation 
is the greatest and last of the virtues in the presence of the 
ultimate enemies of our fortunes. 112 But even remmciation must 
be rooted in the consciousness of success. "No man can be happJJ 
nor ought to be, without a fundamental and necessary success of.· 
his own in dealing with the world of objecta beyond him.n 3 Suc-i 
cess must be my success. I must be able to identify my success:. 
with that of reality. 4 
11 In some degree ••• every soul of us knows the whole, feels 
in his own limbs the throb and impulse of the engines of real-
ity.115 Some omniscience, and omnipotence must be realized by 
the individual in order that it may become "completely real."6 
Hocking conceives the real need of the individual to be identi-
fication rather than vicariousness in the victory of history. 
This he terms, 11 prophetic consciousness." It is a 11 knowledge 
that this act of mine which I now utter is to succeed and hold 
its place in history. 117 Without such assurance the justice or 
reality which makes for happiness is not attainable. 
1. Hocking, MGH, 498. 
2. Hocking, MGH, 498~ 
5. Hocking, MGH, 502. 
6. 503. 
3. Hocking, MGH, 501. 
r' 4. Hocking, MGH, 502. 
----=·· ·-~.-cccc~.c.c~.-~-.cc~ ,~~c.oc.;.,-__ ,,_.,_oc.~- ... ..c-
7. 
Hocking, 
Hocking, 
MGH, 
MGH, 503. 
1l 
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Royce seems to have given some answer to this criticism 
with his criticism of pluralism, and adherence to cosmic or-
ganism. Every act of the individual does count eternally when 
it is. an· .act of renunciation of evil, by being both a fact of 
the eternal consciousness and a fact in the actual atonement of . 
I 
evil. \Vhether such cosmic organism may be justifiable to reaso~ 
seems to be the basic problem involved. The individual, accord~: 
ing to Royce's theory, is an indispensible factor to the moral 
order. The prevalent modern conception of cooperation of the 
i individual and God in history is given much c~edence by Royce. 
'! 
The problem which Hocking has posed seems to lie in anothe~ 
area, however. · If the individual perfection is only attainable 
to an absolute consciousness, will the finite individual ever 
consciously realize perfection? The answer is necessarily no. 
An eternity of striving will never complete the individual's 
knowledge, nor remove the essential evil of being finite, i.e. 
Every finite fact in its incompleteness is evil. One may only 
believe that the absolute has overcome all evils. No world 
view, except mysticism gives the individual complete knowledge 
however, and perfection consists not of completed knowledge of 
all relations but in morality. 
A more serious criticism of the concept of vicarious vic-
tory is that 
the nature of God's suffering is a topic almost 
., certainly beyond our comprehension. What can it 
jl possibly mean? God has no suffering from an im-
===-==#=#: ..· .... -= .. •c-'"·"'--·~-'- ·:."=--"-=-·~- ''-'--~ .-cc.o-'.c·=c-"" .. ~--• o~ ... cc.-=-•·"•=-.. •-· .. c~~~ c._ ... __ 
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perfect wisdom, from a doubtful mind, from defen-
sive fear, from anxiety, from a sense of insecur-
ity.l 
Rogers poses the same question in another way. The iden-
tity of finite and infinite experience is the basis of the en-
tire theory of Royce. "There is, however, one feature of finite'' 
experience where this becomes an apparent contradiction -- the 
conscious sense of finiteness and limitation itself." 2 The i-
dentity of part and whole is impossible since the limitations 
of parts may not be felt by the whole. The "peculiar emotional 
attitudes 11 that go with finite experiences are not conceivably 
present to a completely self-conscious Absolute. That which is , 
an error but positive belief of the finite being cannot be be-
lieved in its erroneous relations by an omniscient being. The 
problem, according to Rogers, is the absence in the analysis of ;' 
Royce "of any adequate recognition of '~feeling' in experiences 
as distinct from thought and will. 113 The problem of finiteness 
is the "peculiar felt character of existence. 11 To leave the 
· feelings out of an analysis of evil would amount to working with! 
1 
abstractions.4 
Miss Calkins has attempted to answer the first argument 
which Rogers and others have brought against this concept of 
Absolute-finite relationship. She uses a common experience as 
an illustration. One who loves a child shares its immaturity. 
, _______ _ 
i 
: 1. Ferr6', ECF, 74. 
fl 2. Rogers, EAP, 296. 
I! 
3. Rogers, EAP, 295~ 
4. Rogers, EAP, 296. 
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I 
,: Its "bewilderment, the foreboding, the baseless hope due to 
childish ignorance [are all shared in a true senseul while one 
t~ stands off as adult self, unperplexed, confident and courageous.!: 
'i 
~ 
This argument, while it carries a certain emotive value does 
:, not seem to touch the heart of the epistemological problem. To 
sympathize or feel with another in weakness may bring forth all " 
of the parallel signs of the weakness itself, but the individual; 
conscious streams themselves are in no essential way united or 
identified. Such sympathetic rapport undoubtedly requires a 
similar prior individual experience in the one sympathizing 
which only returns the problem to its original terms: Can the 
' absolute even have the similar prior experience? 
The epistemological dualist may also recognize the value 
of the suffering of God to the creature without the involvement 
of the dilemma of monism. Dr. Brightman, for instance, con-
ceives the patience of God in suffering to be of 
1 tance. "The secret of noble human patience will 
primary impor- li 
!i 
be found by :! 
the religious man in the sharing of the divine patience. 112 
While the experience itself may in no way be shared, the "sit-
uation believed in" may be shared with equal value to the 
q 
finite individual. Finite individuals are externally related, 
for all such practical purposes, for Royce as well as Dr. Brjgb_t-;:_ 
1,, 
man. We know of God 1 s feeling of our woes only as a situation '[ 
i ~ 
I. 
believed in, although God is not himself involved in the predici! 
; ~ q 
ament of being finite. li 
p 
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CONCLUSION 
1. Unempirical Appeal to Absolute. 
Although Royce begins with finite ideas as they are found 
in experience, he recognizes the existence of an ~bsolute ex-
· perience implicated in finite experience. ':rhe experience of 
: the Absolute is conceived to be completely coherent, the per-
·. fection of all finite ideas. Appeal to the absolute conscious-
ness as problem-solver is essentially unempirical, since many 
of the facts of finite experience are dysteleological in char-
acter. This fact must be denied ultimate significahce. 
2. Difficulties in the Concept of Absolute Experience. 
1) The absolute experience so far transcends man-centered 
values that it is doubtful whether it is of real significance 
as a solution to finite problems. The Absolute knows both the 
·apparent dysteleological surd and its place in the rational 
·order of the whole. The finite individual on the other hand 
<may only trust that this particular evil fact has another sig-
' 
nificance to the rational order of the whole. The validity of 
:the trust, while it rests on the foundations of the Absolute 
I 
iimplicated in finite experience is never centered in the world 
! 
of the finite individual experience of goods and evils itself. 
'It rests rather upon rationalistic principles. 2) The idea of 
·inclusion of many wills within one will is speculs.tive. There 
li 
1: 
I! 
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! is no finite analogy to such inclusion. Although many vlills 
i' 
\ 
·~may select one ideal, the problem of inclusion of many wills in 
another ideal 1Nill seems to be contrary to finite experience. 
3) The' idea of the identity of experience of God and man seems 
to be contrary to an empirical concept of personality. Persons 
are sundered from each other. "Situations experienced 11 are 
never shared. "Situations believed in" only are cormnon to many 
streams of consciousness. In specific consideration of the 
•. problem of the identity of Absolute and finite suffering, the 
unshared element of feeling involved in finite experience is 
of paramount significance. The Absolute cannot feel the feel-
ings of contingency and ignorance of the finite sufferer. 
; 4) The difficulty of conceiving God to be an all-inclusive, 
:timeless Absolute and essentially a-moral being is lessened by 
. the centering of the absolute experience in the present of all 
temporal reality. Past and future realities are for God much 
i as they are for man, vdth the exception of the fact of eternal 
!: knowledge of God. God has a perfect knowledge of all reality 
1: with the exception of the uniqueness of future finite acts. 
3. Difficulties with the Analysis and Solution 
of the Problem of Evil Itself. 
The difficulties which are found in Royce's proposed solu-
:tion to the problem of evil are related in general to the larger 
'problems of his absolute idealism. 
1) The most basic problem i:S concerned 11'Ji th value. The 
96 
Conclusion 
basic conflict of the values of the Absolute versus values of 
the finite is observable es~pecially in the area of facts which 
to finite aomprehension are absolute disvalues. They serve no 
apparent good. 'rhe Absolute, however, who knows all relations, 
'I 
ii 
i1 knows even such facts as instrumental goods. '11hey serve inscru-,, 
:I 
i table ends as far as finite minds are concerned. 
2) Although man may be identified, according to Royce, w.ith 
God in suffering, and may reasonably conceive reaJ.ity as a per-
fect order in which evil facts are overcome, he is not identi-
fled with the Absolute in victory. In the Absolute experience 
all evils are transcended in a conscious experience of victory. 
'• Finite individuals have only an intellectual ( 11 situation be-
lieved in") apprehension of that fact. Appreciation of the in-
ner life of reality is never identification with the experience 
of that life. 
\l 3) The attempt to make surd evil subservient to good tends 
;; 
il to destroy all distinctions between good and evil. As Dr. 
il Brightman notes, "there seems to be evil in the universe so 
:I 
II cruel, so irrational, so unjust that it could not be the work 
!i 
!i 1 
:; of a good God." The inclusiQn of such evil in the absolute 
I; 
II 
\!good whole makes the Absolute morally neutral, or positively 
!I 
1\ evil. 
I ,I 
i\ 4. Value of Royce's -,Nork on the Problem of Evil. 
ii !i Perhaps the most significant values of Royce's work on the 
II~---------
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i! Conclusion 
I 
11 problem of evil are these: 1) His insistence upon the irreduc-
!i 
~ ible character of evil facts. 2) The importance he places upon 
i! 
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the concept of experience. Goods and evils must find place in 
the experience of individuals. Goodness apart from the experi-
ence of struggle with evil is an abstraction. 3) The important: 
place in his absolutism given to the individual in the solution 
of the problem of evil. 
II 
II 
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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
1. Royce's Method. 
The philosophical method of Royce seems to be empirical. 
1 All facts are the experiences of individuals, and no fact may 
exist apart from the experience of individuals. The ultimate 
philosophic principle is the rationality of the '\Yhole, however. 
' Finite experience reveals the need for and existence of a uni-
fying consciousness or absolute reason. The realm of truth 
;; 
is the coherent absolute reason, who is the ultimate interpret- ' 
er of finite particulars. 
In the treatment of evil Royce recounts the empirical 
facts of good and evil in so far as they are comprehensible to 
man. In the ultimate analysis, however, the principle of ra-
tionality is applied to all facts which are considered to be 
beyond the reason of the temporal mind. 
2. Yiorld Order. 
The world order as it is conceived by Royce is one coher-
' ent, whole, internally related being who is the per~ection of 
his finite individual parts, which are objects of his attentive.' 
selection, and in tur~ obtain ethical freedom and responsibil-
ity by attentively selecting him. Temporal order, essential 
to the ethical character of finite individuals, is the content 
:: of the time-span of the Absolute. 
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Abstract of the Thesis 
The two aspects of reality, eternal and temporal, although, 
they form one reality, are mutually exclusive facts in several 
respects. 1) The meanings of values of temporal events (the 
many) are not identical to the values of the one (the Absolute ).1 
Finite values must be translated into the value schema of the 
Absolute. If the Absolute includes all individuals and is thus 
completed individuality, the Absolute is the eenter of value. 
2) The Absolute knows his parts as internally related facts 
while the parts themselves are sundered as individual streams 
of consciousness. 
3. The Nature of Good. 
Goodness is the conscious experience of the mastery of 
evil. Temptation, in which an intimate lmovdedge of evil is 
present is an essential fact of all moral activity. God and 
man are virtuous only as victors over evil. 
The Absolute Self includes both good and evil <.vills of 
finite individuals. Even as men are moral by way of the ten-
sion of good and evil, in which struggle the evil fact as an 
object of knowledge is sublated in the higher unity of victory, 
so God is good because he knows evil, renounces it and becomes 
victor over it. The perfection of the universe requires the 
i !'existence of evil. The Absolute may contain evil and remain 
i virtuous because moral evil is the function of the part and 
I 
'may not be predicated of that which is by definition the whole. 
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4. Evil. 
Royce classifies evil first as volitional and non-voli-
tional, i.e. moral and natural evil. His second classification: 
is upon the basis of value. Evils are either instrumental 
goods or apparent dysteleological surds. Ultimately, or acco:ro-
ing to the completely coherent experience of the Absolute, all :· 
evils are instrumental goods, however. 
The problem of evil lies in the area of dysteleological 
surds. The revaluation of surd evil in the absolute whole, in 
, which it is subservient to good, obscures the essential distin~· 
I 
tions of good and evil in reality, and tends to make the Abso-
i. lute a morally meaningless abstraction. 
5. Atonement. 
Both moral evil anJ the evils of nature are facts of an o~ 
ganic whole, or moral order, from '\~lhich no part may be extri-
; cated. The doctrine of atonement serves bwo purposes in the 
moral order. It is the way of individual self-realization and 
the way of the perfection of the whole. Although evils are ir-
revocable facts of temporal process they may be transmuted into 
good by the creature activity of individuals and communities. 
The good of the overcoming life is of more value than the dis-
value of the original evil deed. Atonement is the mora imman-
ent aspect of Royce's solution of the problem of evil. In the 
act of atonement the individual is identified with the Absolute 
: in the renunciation of and triumph over evil • 
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6. The Suffering of God. 
The more transcendent aspect of the solution to the prob-
lem of evil, according to Royce, is that the Absolute is iden-
tified with him in his suffering. Thus, the ultimacy of the 
good is assured to the temporal being, not only as a fact of 
the absolute consciousness, but also as the fact of his ovm 
life as part of the Absolute. 
Suffering is valued as the way of perfection to both man 
and the Absolute. It is not only condoned by the Absolute, but, 
I! selected as the way of perfection. The selection of this world ii 
i. 
with its goods and evils is ~he ultimate fact of Royce's theod-> 
i icy. Evil is neither a surd in the absolute being which he 
eternally o_t~poses nor the product of finite freedom. It is 
rather a factor of the universe which is the object of the ab-
solute selection and love. 
The individual perfection is attained in the Absolute. 
An infinity of striving cannot remove the essential evil of 
being finite, however. The Absolute cannot know the contin-
gencies of being finite. It cannot experience error without 
the parallel lmowledge of the truth. It cannot feel the de-
spair of the diseased who have no hope of victory. The most 
serious lack in Royce's interpretation of the problem of evil 
~ and in the solution which he has proposed is the neglect of the 
experience of emotion in the Absolute. 
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